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Beyond the ‘New Horizon’
With over 120,000 deployed personnel across 16 missions, and at a cost 
of approximately USD 8 billion per year, the scale of UN peacekeeping 
in 2010 is unprecedented. In July 2009, the UN secretariat released the 
non-paper ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for 
UN Peacekeeping.’ Since then, a dialogue has taken place between the 
Secretariat, the member states and regional partners, that has helped 
identify a set of common priorities to strengthen peacekeeping. However, 
several important issues of contemporary peacekeeping practices were 
not explored in depth in the context of the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper. 
Others have emerged subsequently.
It is with such issues in mind that the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, in partnership with 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, organized the ‘UN 
Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar’ in Geneva in June 2010. The 
objective was to facilitate a dialogue among the research and policy 
community, and to stimulate frank discussion on the range of factors 
most likely to infl uence and direct peacekeeping developments over the 
next few years. This report is an edited volume of the contributions 
prepared for the seminar and covers the following topics:
• Managing consent by host governments and parties to a confl ict 
• Increasing the quantity and quality of civilian and military personnel available 
for UN peacekeeping missions 
• The role of host population perceptions of and expectations from UN 
peacekeeping 
• The challenges of conceptualizing and operationalizing doctrinal approaches 
such as ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘protection of civilians’ 
• Future options for partnership and support between the UN and the AU 
• The role of China in UN peacekeeping
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Beyond the ‘New Horizon’: 
A Seminar on the Future Challenges of 
UN Peacekeeping
 
Cedric de Coning, Andreas Øien Stensland 
and Thierry Tardy
 
The past decade has seen a nine-fold increase in UN peacekeeping opera-
tions. With over 123,000 deployed personnel across 16 missions, and at a
cost of approximately USD 8 billion per year, the scale of United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping today is unprecedented.
 
1
 
 While prior reforms have
enabled growth and helped to define the core strengths of operations, UN
peacekeeping now finds itself, once again, at a crossroads: ‘The scale and
complexity of peacekeeping today are straining its personnel, administra-
tive and support machinery.’
 
2
 
 The peacekeeping partnership is under stress
– among contributors, the Security Council, and the UN Secretariat.
Several current peacekeeping missions are deployed beyond their doctrinal
and capacity comfort zones.
 
3
 
Missions are also facing several challenges on the operational level. First,
they are struggling with the implementation of new assigned tasks, such as
the protection of civilians, linking peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and
interpreting what is meant by a ‘robust’ approach. The absence of clear
 
1. UN Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, DPI/2429/Rev.7, March 2010, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/
factsheet.pdf, accessed on 30 August 2010.
2. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. 
 
A New Partnership
Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping
 
. New York: United Nations, 2009: ii.
[hereinafter New Horizon]
3. See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August
2000 [the Brahimi Report] and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and
Department of Field Support, 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines
 
,
New York: United Nations, 2008: 19.
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guidelines on some of these new tasks, as well as the lack of consensus
among member states on the appropriate role of UN peacekeeping in
others, has hindered missions from accomplishing some of these objectives.
Second, political peace processes are weak or undermined in several mission
settings (Darfur, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), etc.), which
challenges the underlying assumptions of the ‘peace’-keeping doctrine.
Third, missions are experiencing increasing conditionality, or in some cases
even formal withdrawal of consent, by host-state parties (Chad, DRC,
Sudan). Fourth, in the absence of post-settlement peacebuilding solutions,
missions are experiencing difficulties in delivering effective transition and
exit strategies (Timor-Leste, Côte d’Ivoire, pre-earthquake Haiti).
Those characteristics are constant challenges of contemporary peacekeep-
ing operations. They are also at the genesis of the non-paper ‘A New Part-
nership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping’. Released
to member states and peacekeeping partners in July 2009, the document
was prepared by the UN Secretariat to ‘support a reinvigorated dialogue
with the aim of forging a peacekeeping policy agenda that reflects the per-
spectives of all stakeholders in the global peacekeeping partnership.’
 
4
 
 The
non-paper proposes a new agenda, envisioning a partnership in purpose,
in action and for the future. Such a partnership ‘rests on a shared under-
standing among all stakeholders of the objectives of UN peacekeeping’
where a ‘common vision and mutual accountability of all peacekeeping
partners are the basis for unity of purpose and effective action.’
 
5
 
The New Horizon non-paper has stimulated a rich debate in various UN
member-state bodies, the UN Secretariat and its missions, as well as the
broader peacekeeping community. Since its release, a dialogue has taken
place between the Secretariat, the member states and regional partners that
has helped identify a set of common priorities to strengthen peacekeeping.
In the meantime, there are several important facets of contemporary peace-
 
4. The non-paper was prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the
Department of Field Support (DFS) and it was released in the context of the ‘New Horizon’ pro-
cess of developing a forward agenda for UN peacekeeping.
5. New Horizon, footnote 2.
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keeping practice that were not explored in depth in the context of the
‘New Horizon’ non-paper, or that have emerged subsequently.
 
Beyond the ‘New Horizon’
 
It is with such issues in mind that the Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (NUPI) and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy
(GCSP), in partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Oper-
ations (DPKO), organized the ‘UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges
Seminar’ in Geneva from 23 to 24 June 2010. The seminar was arranged
as a closed invitation roundtable, bringing together researchers from
across the globe, as well as policy staff from DPKO, other UN agencies
and the African Union (AU).
The objective was to facilitate a dialogue among the research and policy
community and stimulate frank discussion on the range of factors most
likely to influence and direct peacekeeping developments over the next few
years, including and beyond, the agenda set by the ‘New Horizon’ non-
paper. The organizers, in consultation with DPKO, identified several key
issues, and then invited one presenter and two discussants to introduce each
issue, but the bulk of the time was dedicated to moderated discussions. The
overall aim was to bring together a diverse group of peacekeeping experts
from across the globe, representing different geo-political, socio-cultural,
and policy-research perspectives, so that together they could raise each
other’s awareness and understanding of the future challenges facing UN
peacekeeping operations to another level.
 
Key Future Challenges
 
Over six sessions, the seminar used the following entry-point topics to
debate the key future challenges facing UN peacekeeping:
• the trend towards increasing conditionality and/or withdrawal of con-
sent by host governments and other parties to a conflict;
• options for increasing the number of civilian and military personnel
available for UN peacekeeping missions, and for engaging contributors
in decisions regarding the kinds of capabilities that need to be devel-
oped for future challenges;
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• the role of host population perceptions and expectations in terms of
UN peacekeeping credibility and accountability;
• the challenges of conceptualizing and operationalizing doctrinal
approaches such as ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘protection of civilians’;
• future options for partnership and support between the UN and the AU.
This report is an edited volume of the presentations delivered at the seminar
to introduce each of these topics. In addition, the volume contains a back-
ground paper on the role of China in UN peacekeeping. The programme
and list of participants are attached as annexes. This first chapter introduces
the debate and gives an overview of some of the key issues raised.
 
Managing Consent
 
Managing the ongoing consent amongst the parties to the conflict, includ-
ing especially the host government with whom the mission is legally con-
tracting, is a challenge that goes back to the birth of multidimensional
peacekeeping. Recently, UN peacekeeping missions have experienced seri-
ous challenges to – or even direct withdrawal of – consent in Burundi,
Chad, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea and in Darfur. Ian Johnstone’s paper
presents the partnership between the host government and the UN as a
relational contract, one in which the content of the contract emerges from
the interactions throughout the relationship. He argues that the UN’s
leverage towards the host state is at its highest at the start of a mission.
Over time, a strengthened host government and the waning will of the
intervening countries, combine to undermine the leverage of the UN.
Johnstone’s contribution raises important questions as to how the UN can
use its leverage to remain engaged across the multidimensional spectrum,
without looking and behaving like an unwelcome occupation force.
Whose consent matters – that of the parties to the conflict or that of the
affected population? Some argued in the seminar that the concept of local own-
ership, although an important principle, is difficult to define, and even more
difficult to measure. Closely related, especially in some cases, is the dilemma of
engaging with spoilers or ‘untouchable’ elements, such as groups identified by
the international community as ‘terrorist groups’. This issue becomes even
more complex in situations where such groups have demonstrated public sup-
port, e.g. Hezbollah in Lebanon, or where they represent an important political
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faction in the political process. For the contract on consent to be effective, it has
to be established not only with the groups acceptable to the international com-
munity, but with all key stakeholders in the peace process.
Others argued that the UN’s leverage hinges not only on its actions on the
ground, but also on its role in representing the will of the international
community – an international community to which the host government
wishes to remain a legitimate member. In this context, active political sup-
port from a strong majority in the Security Council, especially among the
permanent members, is essential to managing the consent of the parties.
In some cases, UN peacekeeping missions do not face a formal withdrawal
of consent, but are instead confronted with an incremental, but deter-
mined effort to frustrate the work of the mission through bureaucratic and
procedural obstacles used by host governments to signal their de facto
withholding of consent. In these cases, the UN has had to choose between
withdrawal, which would most likely place the host population at risk, and
more intrusive missions, which also poses risks, not least to the host pop-
ulation. Usually, the choice has been to continue to try to execute the man-
date as effectively as possible under less than ideal circumstances, whilst at
the same time trying to manage consent through strategic pressure and
other means. The relationship between the UN and the government of
Sudan in the context of Darfur is a case in point.
Some argued that the current working method of renewing mandates on
an annual basis leaves the UN at the mercy of the host governments. The
point was therefore made that protection mandates should be issued
against benchmarks, not time-frames. This would not remove the obliga-
tion to review progress regularly, but it would shift the focus from obtain-
ing the consent of the host government to a discussion on the results
achieved over the relevant time-period.
 
Expanding and Engaging TCCs and Civilian Contributors: 
Towards a Capability-driven Approach to Peacekeeping
 
According to the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper, a broad-based, global partici-
pation underpins legitimacy and strong partnership. More equitable par-
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ticipation and contribution of troops, police and civilians to peacekeeping
operations will enable a more collective burden-sharing and help build a
shared understanding of the challenges to be met.
 
6
 
 Today, however, the
perception of the peacekeeping experience varies greatly, depending on
the three following categories of states: those in which large-scale peace
operations are deployed (mainly in Africa); those supplying the bulk of
peacekeeping forces (most notably in South Asia and Africa); and those
providing most of the funding for peace operations (the United States,
European Union (EU) members and Japan).
 
7
 
This informal ‘division of tasks’ gives rise to several concerns. For instance,
some argue that the latter group of mostly Western states are using the
former group, mostly from the global South, in an effort to ensure that the
countries emerging out of conflict, who are also predominantly in the
South, adopt liberal democratic or neo-liberal forms of government.
Don Daniel’s contribution investigates the feasibility of expanding and
engaging the pool of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to UN peace
operations. Discussions focused on the importance of the quality – rather
than quantity – of contributions. This demands increased attention to the
comparative advantages of every potential contributing country and an
increased focus on training and experience-sharing mechanisms. Various
questions were raised related to the different potential avenues open to the
UN to expand the pool of potential contributors. For instance, how can
the contribution of troops to UN peacekeeping missions be made more
attractive to states that have the capacity, but traditionally have not parti-
cipated in UN peacekeeping – as is the case with several countries in the
Gulf and more generally in the Middle East? Others asked whether an
eventual NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan would result in more West-
ern countries participating in UN operations in future.
 
6. New Horizon, footnote 2.
7. See Gowan, Richard. ‘The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis’, 2006–08. 
 
International
Peacekeeping
 
 15, no 4, 2008: 453–69.
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Civilian Capacities in UN Peace Operations
 
New peacekeeping tasks also require a high number of civilian specialists –
a group often in limited supply both at home and abroad. Civilians now
represent approximately 20% of all UN peacekeepers. This change has
come about as mandates changed from monitoring military ceasefires to
supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements. Cedric
de Coning’s contribution discusses the challenges related to this shift, most
notably the problems with recruitment and deployment to UN missions.
Despite the high number of people willing to serve in UN missions, the
organization suffers from high vacancy rates. He argues that by improving
the link between training, rostering and recruitment, the UN should be able
to enhance a more capability-driven approach to strengthening the civilian
capacity for UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.
During seminar discussions, it was proposed that UN member states
should consider how the structural shortcomings in the existing recruit-
ment procedures of the UN Secretariat can be reformed. Some called for
revisiting the proposal to create a standing capacity of UN peacekeeping
personnel. Such a group would form a core cadre of professional peace-
keepers that could be moved among missions, without the UN system hav-
ing to appoint new staff, or issue new contracts every time. This would ease
the pressure on new recruitments, make investment in training more
worthwhile, and in general result in a more professional cadre of civilian
peacekeeping personnel with a sustained interest in improving the overall
capability and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. Such a cadre
of professional civilian peacekeeping personnel should place an emphasis
on gender balance and reflect the type of socio-cultural background –
including language skills, experiences and knowledge – relevant for the
types of missions the UN is engaged with at a particular time-period.
Concern was expressed about the potential negative side-effects of further
increasing the number of civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions. These
included the danger of creating parallel institutions that undermine the very
local government capacities these missions are mandated to build and sup-
port, as well as contributing to brain-drain by hiring a sizable percentage of
knowledgeable and experienced personnel to work for international organi-
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zations. The option of embedding international staff in local government
structures, rather than with the UN mission, was discussed, as was its many
complicated side-effects. Another consideration was increasing the use of
expertise in the diaspora, although, as the discussion showed, this option is
not always ideal and can also have a range of unintended consequences. The
discussion also considered the importance of building local civilian capacity
and the role UN peacekeeping missions can play in this regard.
 
Assessing Host Population Perceptions and Expectations
 
Building partnerships does not only mean engaging the host government
in constructive peacekeeping efforts. It also requires engagement with the
population of the host state. However, critical debate on the local impact
of peacekeeping, and particularly on host perceptions and expectations,
was found wanting. In his contribution to this volume, Michael Pugh
argues that sovereignty, local agency and perceptions, as well as the
accountability of local leaders, must be taken seriously for peacekeeping
missions to be legitimate and effective. After all, it is the host communities
themselves that must live with – and support – the volatile and untidy
peace that will last long after the peacekeepers have gone.
Discussions focused on the unintended consequences, both positive and
negative, of the presence of peacekeeping missions. Personnel in UN opera-
tions must be aware that their choices create winners and losers in host com-
munities. Moreover, local communities do not simply passively accept what
the peacekeeping mission has to offer. They may resist some and incorporate
other parts of the peacekeeping missions’ message, depending on their own
needs and perceptions, and as a way of instrumentalizing the peacekeeping
presence in their own lives. Monitoring local perceptions will assist the
peacekeeping mission with understanding how its messages are received and
what effects the mission’s messaging and actions may be having.
Another theme that was touched on is the complexity of identifying local
counterparts, and thereby influencing which local needs and expectations
will be listened to. Another was the difficulty of understanding local context:
whilst local communities usually want physical and moral security, restora-
tion of rights, property and dignity, sustainable livelihoods and employ-
ment, their understanding of these issues may be very different from those
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of the peacekeepers. For instance, a society may need and thus cooperate
with peacekeepers on protection issues, but reject initiatives to reform their
traditional justice systems, even if, in the view of the peacekeepers, the justice
system is linked to protection risks. Another example from the district of
Abyei in Sudan that was shared at the seminar is indicative of the kind of
capacities and coping strategies that local communities may employ. In this
case, the local community did not ask for direct protection from the UN
peacekeepers. Rather, they wished to know how the UN mission would react
if there was an outbreak of hostilities – so that they could plan their own
responses accordingly.
 
Robust Peacekeeping and Protection of Civilians
 
Over the last decade, the mandates of authorized UN operations have usu-
ally included wording that provides these missions with the authority to
use force, among other to protect civilians in imminent threat of physical
violence. Whilst many view this as a welcome and much-needed develop-
ment, others are concerned with some of the implications. Two inter-
related aspects of particular concern are whether these new mandates
require UN missions to use force differently than before; and the means
through which these missions are intended to achieve the protection of
civilians.
Discussions focused on the issue of robust peacekeeping, understood both
as a broad concept relating to a firm political stance of key stakeholders vis-
à-vis a peacekeeping mandate and as a more narrow idea articulated
around the possible use of force in mandate implementation.
Robustness is supposed to allow a peacekeeping operation to protect itself,
to ensure some freedom of manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the
implementation of the mandate or more broadly the peace process is taken
hostage by spoilers. However, those that promote robust peacekeeping have
not been able to articulate the concept clearly enough to convince those
who express concerns about it – and these are generally the countries of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – of what it entails and why it is neces-
sary. The NAM countries have criticized the concept for its lack of clarity,
and have questioned some of its underlying assumptions, for instance that
more robustness necessarily implies greater effectiveness. Some in the C-34
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also suggest that peacekeeping already acts robustly and therefore question
the need for a change and/or further conceptual definition.
With regard to the use of force, some argue that the minimum use of force
remains one of the three key principles of UN peacekeeping, and that the
use of force, including to protect civilians, must be a last resort. Others hold
that the UN should adopt a new, more ‘robust’ approach to peacekeeping,
which implies a new willingness to use force where necessary to achieve the
mission’s protection mandate. This also implies that the way in which
peacekeeping missions are managed and commanded, and the way in which
their forces are structured, equipped and trained, must change accordingly.
Thierry Tardy’s contribution questions the coherence and feasibility of the
concept of robust peacekeeping, particularly the extent to which the con-
cept is politically acceptable and operationally viable. Beyond the doctrinal
difficulty of ensuring compatibility of robustness with the principles of
peace operations, robust peacekeeping is directly challenged by long-lasting
constraints of contemporary peace operations, such as weak political sup-
port, erratic availability and quality of troops, and reticence of the troop
contributors to embrace a robust approach. Also, although the C-34 even-
tually agreed on the need for an intensified dialogue on deterrence of threats
through a particular posture, deliberations in the C-34 indicated that the
NAM countries are reluctant towards robust peacekeeping – particularly
with all its current connotations. This, however, does not mean that they
are opposed to the use of force for protection.
Seminar discussions stressed the importance of not confining the debate about
robustness to the use of force, and to include its political dimensions, as does
the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper. In the meantime, discussions revealed scepti-
cism towards the concept of ‘robustness’. Some of the panellists proposed to
change the name to ‘effective peacekeeping’ (as suggested by some of the
NAM countries), as this would call attention to effectiveness rather than the
implicit reference to the use of force. Several argued that the whole idea of
robust peacekeeping has become so politicized, and the debate so polarized,
that it would be impossible to find a new version of the concept that is accept-
able to all parties. Rather, it was argued, ‘adjectives should be avoided’ alto-
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gether. The point was made that the ‘robustness’ necessary for force protection
is already a possibility within the current concept of peacekeeping. The main
concern should be to bolster ‘robust’ political will at the top level, although
the very meaning of the word ‘robust’ in this case is not clear. In any case, a
more firm political stance could increase the standing and legitimacy of a
peacekeeping mission, making ‘robustness’ at the tactical level less necessary.
 
The UN and Africa – Options for Partnership and Support
 
The ‘New Horizon’ non-paper envisions two ways that the UN can con-
tribute to strengthening the capacity of the AU and other regional organi-
zations. Firstly, UN support to the AU can help build long-term capability
for the future. Secondly, an emphasis on reinforcing interoperability
between the UN and the AU can enhance cooperation and ensure effective
utilization of limited global peacekeeping resources. The contribution by
Kwesi Aning and Horname Noagbesenu discusses some of the challenges
of coordination between the AU, the UN and the EU in multidimensional
peace support operations in Africa. While these organizations have their
comparative strengths and weaknesses, the article identifies some of the
gaps in this relationship and suggests areas of improvement. For instance,
they argue that whilst the UN’s support to the AU has been very useful, it
is the EU’s financial support to the AU that has sustained its peacekeeping
engagements in Somalia and Darfur.
Several panellists were critical of the capacity of the AU and the African
Standby Forces (ASF) to date. While the AU is in the process of increasing
its capacity for peacekeeping, the general sentiment was that the progress
is too slow, and does not match the needs of the continent. On the other
hand, some expressed frustration with the way in which the UN and ‘inter-
national community’ have directed the AU to deal with situations they
have been unwilling or unable to deal with through other means – includ-
ing through UN peacekeeping – while at the same time withholding from
the AU the resources that it needs to be more effective.
Another issue was the degree to which AU peacekeeping was still consid-
ered a purely military affair. The UN can do more to foster an understand-
ing of the function of multidimensional peacekeeping, and to strengthen
the civilian and police dimensions of the ASF.
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The degree to which the stabilization mandate of the AU’s mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) could be regarded as a novelty, or as the new emerg-
ing norm for AU peace support operations, was discussed. Some feared that
the tendency of the UN Security Council to dispatch understaffed and
under-resourced AU missions to conflict areas, such as Darfur and Soma-
lia, would in the end pull the UN into areas of operation beyond their
capacities. They argued that when AU missions no longer have the funding
or resources to remain engaged, the UN would be compelled to take over,
and this will result in the UN having to undertake missions beyond its
peacekeeping capabilities.
 
Emphasizing the Peacemaking and Peacebuilding 
dimensions of Peacekeeping – China’s influence on the 
future of UN peacekeeping
 
One theme touched upon in almost every session was the potential future
impact of China’s increasingly important role in UN peace operations.
China’s contributions of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations have
expanded dramatically in recent years. In June 2010, China was the 15
 
th
 
largest contributor to UN missions, providing more troops, police and
military observers than any other permanent member of the UN Security
Council.
 
8
 
 While initially sceptical of UN peacekeeping, fearing that it was
a tool of Western domination, China’s attitude towards peacekeeping has
evolved from hesitant participation to more comprehensive contributions.
Over the past 20 years, China has participated in 18 UN peacekeeping
operations, and dispatched a total of 15,000 peacekeepers. At present,
around 2,000 Chinese officers and soldiers are involved in nine of the 15
UN operations. Providing engineers, transport battalions and field hospi-
tals, China contributes critically needed enabling capabilities. As a mem-
ber of the Security Council and a prominent contributor of police and mil-
itary peacekeepers, China also has the potential to influence the future
direction of UN peacekeeping doctrine. Until now, however, China has
been a very cautious contributor. It has not been very assertive in either the
Security Council or in its relations with other member states or the UN
Secretariat, when it comes to peacekeeping doctrine and related matters.
 
8. See: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/june10_1.pdf, accessed on
30 August 2010.
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Lei Zhao’s contribution presents China’s official motivations for engaging
in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, underlining both nor-
mative and instrumental motives in a very positive light. While China is
already highly involved in peacekeeping, a prerequisite for further Chinese
engagement is addressing how to bolster the protection of peacekeeping
forces, whilst the transformative objectives of peacebuilding makes this
concept more controversial in the Chinese policy context. Zhao’s contri-
bution provides important insights into the fundamental differences
between the Western and Chinese understanding of the concept. Thus far,
China’s emphasis has been on peacebuilding through development, pov-
erty reduction and quick-impact projects. For the future, Chinese policy
holds that greater attention should be paid to combining direct prevention
with broader, long-term preventive efforts geared at development.
 
Conclusion
 
The seminar stimulated a rich debate. It was clear that peacekeeping
remains at the cutting edge where ideas and practice meet. Peacekeeping is
a microcosm of all the issues and tensions that exist within the peace, secu-
rity and development dimension of the international system. One specific
question that materialized out of the discussions was the tension between
broadening and deepening the UN peacekeeping agenda. Should the UN
Secretariat be at the forefront of developing new operational concepts such
as robustness and protection, or should it focus on consolidating and pro-
fessionalizing the peacekeeping capacity of the UN? Most seminar partic-
ipants felt that the UN Secretariat should be doing both, but that the bal-
ance between the two should be determined by the context. The
Secretariat has a responsibility not just to professionalize current practice,
but also to look beyond the horizon to prepare for future challenges, and
to understand and respond to medium- to long-term trends.
One suggestion was that the UN Secretariat, in its advice to the UN
Security Council, should articulate more clearly the capacity and limita-
tions that peacekeeping missions have to foster peace. One discussion
explored whether the vision of peacekeeping is broadening or narrowing,
in particular with respect to peacebuilding roles. Some questioned
whether the current doctrinal basis captures the diversity of response
tools and mechanisms. Others asked where the comparative advantages
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of different entities and actors lie, and how the international community
can maintain flexibility of response while maintaining a coherent
approach.
Despite having to navigate a diplomatic tightrope, UN peacekeeping has
proven remarkably adaptable. Over the last two decades UN peacekeeping
has expanded, contracted and expanded again against all expectations. It
has undertaken a challenging range of missions, and it has transformed the
way in which missions are planned and managed, both at headquarters in
New York and in the field.
This kind of seminar, where those engaged in navigating the reality and
those that make a profession of thinking about how peacekeeping can be
done differently come together to help shape each others ideas about the
possible and probable, forms a critical part of this process of adaptation
and transformation.
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Managing Consent – The New Variable?
Ian Johnstone
In recent years consent to UN peacekeeping has faced powerful challenges
in Burundi, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Sudan, Chad and the DRC.1 Host govern-
ments have either called for premature withdrawal of the missions or have
so obstructed the operations that fulfilling the mandate became close to
impossible. While these challenges have been more direct than what the
UN is used to, and may portend a new wave of discontent with UN peace-
keeping, they are not new. How to gain, hold and build consent is a chal-
lenge that goes back at least to the birth of multidimensional operations.
The issues to which it gives rise are conceptual as well as operational,
including the nature of consent, the nature of peacekeeping and the nor-
mative climate in which consent is granted and peacekeeping occurs.
The Nature of Consent
This article begins with some observations about the nature of consent in
peacekeeping practice, doctrine and legal theory. I introduce the notion of
a ‘relational contract’ as a framework for analysing the contested and com-
plex nature of consent in peace operations. The second part presents five
dilemmas associated with managing consent. The final section, ‘strategies’,
draws on relational contract theory to offer proposals on how to manage
those dilemmas.
Consent in Peacekeeping Practice
In the context of peacekeeping, consent is the principle that distinguishes
Chapter VI from Chapter VII operations: peacekeeping from enforcement
action. The voluminous academic literature and official debate on the grey
1. Research for this paper was done as part of a larger study that the author is undertaking for the
Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The views
expressed herein are those of the author alone.
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area between the two – the contested ground of peace enforcement – has
not fully clarified the blurred lines.2 Today, many UN peace operations
have Chapter VII mandates to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians;
the mandate of the Haiti mission (MINUSTAH) includes Chapter VII
powers to support the transitional government in providing a secure and
stable environment.3 The entire mandate of UNMIL is under Chapter
VII, even though it was conceived as a consent-based multidimensional
operation.4 The same was true for ONUB.5 Conversely, the expanded UN
mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) includes the authority to ‘take all necessary
action to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activi-
ties of any kind… and to protect civilians’, yet was placed entirely under
Chapter VI for political reasons.6 The latest mandate for the UN operation
in Chad/CAR (MINURCAT) shifted from Chapter VII to VI in defer-
ence to the wishes of the government, yet still includes the authority to
protect civilians.7
The Chapter VI/VII distinction may not be meaningful in abstract legal
terms and it is rarely determinative when it comes to operational strategies,
but it does have political significance when debates arise at UNHQ and in
the field about what a peace operation can and cannot do. The challenge is
often to find the right balance between consent and coercion, a fault line of
debate in contemporary peacekeeping. Consider the difficulty of operation-
alizing consent in multidimensional peacekeeping missions. While formal
consent is always granted in some manner, it is typically qualified in one of
three ways: it is either unreliable, brought about by external pressure, or
2. The latest effort is the ‘Capstone Doctrine’: ‘Although the line between ‘robust’ peacekeeping
and peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, there are important differences between the
two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force a the tactical level with the consent of
the host-state authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve
the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for member
states under Article 2(4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.’, United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, New York: United Nations, 2008: 19
[hereinafter, the Capstone Doctrine].
3. Security Council Resolution 1542 (2004).
4. Security Council Resolution 1509(2003).
5. Security Council Resolution 1545 (2004).
6. Security Council Resolution 1701(2006).
7. Security Council Resolution 1923 (2010).
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open-ended. Unreliable consent is common in conflicts involving more
than two actors not under the complete control of the main protagonists.
Even when a ceasefire or peace agreement is signed, there is no guarantee it
will be respected. Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the 1995 Day-
ton Agreement are early post-Cold War examples. Sierra Leone is a more
recent example, where the freedom of movement of some UNAMSIL
peacekeepers was so restricted that they were virtual hostages. In the DRC,
MONUC was first deployed in 2000 to monitor the Lusaka Agreement,
but the cooperation of the eight signatories (six governments and two rebel
groups) was always tenuous, and multiple armed groups posed – and still
pose – a challenge to the peacekeepers. In Sudan, the Darfur Peace Agree-
ment, signed by the government and only one rebel faction, quickly became
meaningless as a basis for consent to the UN mission (UNAMID).
Bosnia-Herzegovina after Dayton, Kosovo and East Timor are cases of
consent under pressure. In the first two, consent to the peace operations
followed NATO bombing campaigns. In East Timor, Indonesia con-
sented to INTERFET only after ten days of intense diplomatic pressure,
threats of economic sanctions and a speech by the Secretary-General warn-
ing of international criminal prosecution. Thus in all three places, the con-
sent granted was hardly an act of volition, and indeed verged on duress.
Open-ended consent is illustrated by Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozam-
bique, where the parties invited the UN to monitor and support implemen-
tation of a comprehensive peace agreement. No peace agreement, no matter
how comprehensive, can provide for every contingency. Gaps in the accords
materialize, problems of interpretation arise and circumstances change
throughout the life of a peace process. Signing these peace agreements, with
obligations that are not well-specified and that will take time to implement
is, in effect, a gesture of faith that later problems can be worked out on a
consensual basis. The peace agreements remained the foundation of the
peace process in all three, but actual implementation deviated from them,
especially in Cambodia.
Consent in Peacekeeping Doctrine
The UN Capstone Doctrine (2008) is notable for two innovations on the
issue of consent. First, it stresses that the consent required is not only to the
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presence of a peacekeeping operation, but also to a political process.8 More
helpful than the truism that peacekeeping is not the right instrument when
there is no peace to keep is the notion that peacekeeping can succeed only if
accompanied by a viable political process. Gauging the viability of a political
process is no easy task. Both parties to the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire wanted
a UN peacekeeping mission, but for different and incompatible reasons.
The Secretary-General ultimately recommended and the Security Council
agreed to the deployment of a mission in the hope that peacekeepers could
help cultivate a political process. While large-scale violent conflict has not
broken out since the deployment, the ‘viability’ of the peace process has
been in doubt. The UN originally recommended against deploying a mis-
sion to Chad because there was no political process for it to support. The
SC authorized EUFOR Chad/RCA as a compromise, but with a limited
security mandate and on the understanding that the UN would take over in
a year. When MINURCAT was deployed with the grudging consent of the
government, it had no political mandate and therefore no ability to nurture
a political process. The government’s demand for its early withdrawal,
therefore, was hardly surprising.
A second important Capstone innovation is the distinction between ‘tactical’
and ‘strategic’ consent.9 The idea is that a UN mission must gain and keep the
consent of the main parties to the conflict, but can act robustly against spoilers
at the local level without losing its character as peacekeeping. While this marks
a step forward in doctrinal thinking, it is not clear how workable the distinc-
tion is in the field. Determining whether the source of a particular ‘spoiler’ is
a minor actor operating locally or a proxy for one of the main parties is not
easy. In the DRC and Sudan (both Darfur and the South), there are many
groups that could fall in one category or the other; whether to take them on
militarily or negotiate for their cooperation is a difficult judgment call.
8. Capstone Doctrine, 31.
9. The terminology is used on p. 19 of the Capstone Doctrine and the idea is developed at pp.
31–32. It echoes the British notion of ‘wider peacekeeping’ introduced in 1993, which drew on
recent experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia and from observing the USA in Somalia.
The doctrine holds that in complex internal conflicts, consent can be lost at the tactical level (i.e.
the peacekeepers may be challenged by a local group and can use force against them) but this
must not be allowed to bring about a loss of consent at the strategic or operational level (i.e. con-
sent to the overall mission).
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Consent in Relational Contract Theory
Consent is a contested concept not only in peacekeeping practice, but also
in domestic and international law. This essay does not delve into all the
legal dimensions, but relational contract theory is an illuminating way of
thinking about peace agreements. Contract theory envisions all contracts
as being on a spectrum that ranges from discrete, one-off transactions to
long-term relational arrangements. A contract is relational ‘to the extent
that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrange-
ment to well-defined obligations, [either] because of the inability to iden-
tify uncertain future conditions or because of inability to characterize com-
plex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies themselves can
be identified…’10 A transactional contract, by contrast, involves a discrete,
one-time exchange of goods. To illustrate, in the context of economic rela-
tions, a collective bargaining agreement between a union and management
is relational; buying a full tank of petrol from a station on a highway far
from home is a one-off transaction. In the context of personal relations, a
marriage is a relational contract; a one-night stand is a transaction.11 The
two are on a spectrum: almost all contracts are ‘relational’ to an extent and
even the most relational contracts have ‘transactional’ qualities. 12
Peace agreements are like relational contracts in various ways. First, the
parties want and expect the relationship to endure. They are committed to
making it work, even if there are disputes over how. Second, the terms of
the relationship are somewhat open-ended. The contract is not simply an
exchange of obligations, but a framework for managing an on-going
potentially, long-term relationship. Third, the content of the contract and
meaning of its provisions develops over the course of the relationship,
through interaction. Fourth, relational contracts tend to implicate stake-
10. Goetz, C. and R. Scott. ‘Principles of Relational Contracts’. Virginia Law Review 6 1981:1089–1091.
See also Eisenberg, Melvin. ‘Relational Contracts’, in Beatson, Jack and Daniel Friedmann (eds).
Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
11. Leckey, R. ‘Relational Contracts and Other Models of Marriage’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 40,
no. 1, 2002.
12. The leading relational contract theorist is I.R. Macneil. See his The New Social Contract: An
Inquiry Into Modern Contractual Relations. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980; also his
‘Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries’. Northwestern University Law Review 94,
no. 3, 2000: 877.
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holders other than the immediate parties (for example, other companies
with whom the party to a collective bargaining agreement has contractual
relations). Fifth, relational contracts are ‘living documents’ whose terms
must be interpreted and applied in light of changing circumstances. Sixth,
consent matters but the nature of the consent must be understood in the
context of the overall relationship (including the power dynamics) and not
merely what was explicitly assented to at the time of signing.
Managing Consent: Dilemmas and Challenges
Uncertainty About the Core Business of Peacekeeping
Uncertainty about how transformative multidimensional peacekeeping
should be creates dilemmas for managing consent. Doctrinal thinking in
the UN describes ‘sustainable peace’ as the goal of any peace process, char-
acterized by action in five areas: security; political processes; rule of law and
human rights; governance and public administration; and socio-economic
development. Precisely how these functions are conceived varies among
the missions, but the extent to which they permeate policy documents and
mandates is striking.13 This ambitious agenda raises questions about
whether peace operations are exercises in social engineering based on lib-
eral democratic models, and it raises concerns about the transformative
capacity of outside intervention: even if the creation of liberal democratic
states is a worthy goal, what can outsiders do to achieve that goal?
It also gives rise to questions about the core business of peacekeeping. What
is it that peacekeepers, as opposed to other external actors, can be expected to
do during the limited period when they are deployed? The Capstone Doc-
trine focuses on security, rule of law, political processes and coordination.14
13. In the UN context, see for example, United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General. No Exit
Without Strategy, S/2001/384, 20 April 2001; Center on International Cooperation. Building on
Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty. April 2009; Department of Peacekeeping
Operations and Department of Field Support. A New Partnership Agenda: Chartering a New
Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. July 2009 [hereinafter New Horizon]; United Nations, Report of
the Secretary General. Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath
of conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009. For thinking outside the UN context, see
United States Institute for Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. 2009.
14. Capstone Doctrine, 23.
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The ‘New Horizon’ non-paper specifies that among the priorities established
in the Secretary-General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding, ‘support to national
political processes and the provision of safety and security’ are a peacekeeping
operation’s core capacities. This may include ‘the re-establishment of frame-
works for governance,’ but leaves out things like the provision of basic ser-
vices and the socio-economic dimensions of peacebuilding – where peace-
keepers are primarily in the role of supporting other external actors.15
This is already a step back from the most ambitious vision for peacekeep-
ing. There is pressure for further retrenchment, driven by a sense that the
transformative goals of peacebuilding are simply too ambitious, as well as
financial considerations and lack of political will. The implications for
managing consent are profound, and in fact cut both ways. On the one
hand, it is easier to sustain genuine consent for minimal goals. Fewer inter-
locutors need to be engaged and the leverage of outsiders can be targeted.
On the other hand, consent to a minimalist intervention may not provide
sufficient reassurance to all stakeholders. Consider the perspective of rebel
groups. To lay down their arms and join a political process may require
more in exchange from the government than a promise to treat the rebels-
fairly when the peacekeepers leave. They may insist on the transformation
of political, legal and administrative institutions, with some sort of exter-
nal guarantee that the changes will hold.
Peacekeeping as an Obsolescing Bargain
If a peacekeeping mandate is a ‘bargain’ between outside actors and local
elites, then in simple (and highly stylized) terms, it looks like this: local
elites want security and development assistance, in exchange for which
they are willing to tolerate governance reforms, human rights monitoring
and other elements of the liberal peace.16 Since the former is likely to rein-
force the power of the elites and the latter undermine it, ongoing negotia-
tion on the implementation of the mandate is likely to be necessary. In this
sense, a peace agreement is more like a ‘relational contract’ between three
15. New Horizon, 23.
16. Barnett, M. and C. Zurcher, ‘The peacebuilders’ contract: how external statebuilding reinforces
weak statehood’, in Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Con-
fronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Oxon: Routledge, 2009.
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or more actors – the parties to the conflict and the external actors – than a
one-off bilateral transaction.
If there is any truth to that stylized description of a peacekeeping mandate,
it is also true that the bargain is an obsolescing one. As Doyle and Samba-
nis explain, the authority of the UN is never greater than at the moment
of signing a peace treaty because that is when the parties are most depen-
dent on the UN, and the UN has put little of its prestige and resources on
the line.17 David Edelstein adds that the welcome of intervening forces by
the host population tends to diminish over time.18 I would add further that
this ‘obsolescing welcome’ is matched by ‘obsolescing will’ in intervening
countries, especially when the perceived costs of continued deployment
start to outweigh benefits. Afghanistan is a case in point.
Adding a further layer of complexity, the dynamics of the bargain depend
on the strength of the government with which one is dealing. Typically,
the UN starts out dealing with weak transitional governments, as in Haiti,
Burundi and the DRC. The governments need the UN (and other external
actors), especially for security and development assistance, and therefore
are willing to tolerate significant external interference in exchange. But as
the government becomes stronger, it becomes less tolerant of international
tutelage – content to accept a small peacebuilding presence if that means
greater economic aid, but less interested in a military presence and gover-
nance advice. This dynamic played out in Burundi after the 2005 elections
and the DRC after the 2006 elections. While understandable, it is ironic
that a purpose of peacekeeping is to strengthen sovereign capacity to pro-
vide security throughout the state, but the stronger the government gets,
the less leverage outsiders have to ensure it does so in a legitimate and sus-
tainable manner. Victory in the 2006 elections made the DRC govern-
ment feel strong enough to begin exerting its will vis-à-vis opposition
forces and outsiders, but still weak enough that it feared those forces and
therefore sought to neutralize them through less-than-democratic means.
17. Doyle, M. and N. Sambanis. Making War and Building Peace. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006: 309.
18. Edelstein, D. ‘Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions and Postwar Statebuilding’, in Paris
and Sisk (eds). The Dilemmas of Statebuilding, 2009: 81, 83.
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The dilemma for the UN in these cases is how to use its declining leverage
to remain engaged across the multi-dimensional spectrum, without look-
ing and behaving like an unwelcome occupation force.
In Sudan, the UN has been dealing with a relatively strong government
from the start. The International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment,
though criticized for its timing and potential impact on the peace process,
did provide leverage that led the government to become more cooperative
on the deployment of UNAMID, visas, customs and the like. In the 2010
elections, however, President Bashir consolidated his power, which may
lead to a return to more repressive rule.19 It also gave the government new
confidence in dealing with UNAMID, illustrated by an announcement at
the end of July 2010, shortly after the mission’s mandate was extended for
a year, that the peacekeepers would have their bags searched at airports,
and would have to inform the Sudanese government before moving on
roads, even within cities.20
Ownership: Consent of the Parties or Compact 
with the Population?
There is a premium on local ownership in a peace process, both as a norma-
tive stance (people ought to have control over the decisions that affect their
lives) and as a requirement for effectiveness (no peace process will succeed
if there is not broad buy-in). But what does that mean in practice? Working
with those who hold power – typically the parties to the conflict and peace
agreement – is the starting point. But conventional wisdom is that local
ownership cannot stop there. Factional leaders do not necessarily represent
broad constituencies, and the institutions created in deference to their pref-
erences may not be respected by other stakeholders who have the capacity
to undermine a peace process. The difficulty of cultivating stable, legitimate
governance in Afghanistan is a case in point. Sustainable peace requires
inclusive politics. In terms of managing consent, this means engaging with
opposition parties, the legislative branch, mid-level government officials,
local governors and administrators, civil society and the private sector.
19. The Economist, ‘Back to the bad old ways: Sudan after the elections’, 5 June 2010: 54.
20. BBC. ‘Sudan to monitor movements of UN peacekeepers’, 31 July 2010, available at http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10829620
0000 100817 GRMAT B#4BD29E.book  Page 33  Wednesday, October 20, 2010  10:21 AM
34 Ian Johnstone
Moreover, the peacekeeping ‘bargain’ is not reached in a vacuum; it occurs
within a normative framework embodied in the UN Charter and elabo-
rated through legal instruments and organization practice. These norms
and values have evolved since 1945, as have the parameters of consent.
What constitutes matters that are ‘essentially within domestic jurisdiction’
(Article 2(7)) has narrowed, and the scope for UN ‘intervention’ has wid-
ened. This is true for ‘enforcement measures under Chapter VII’ but also
for consent-based peacekeeping. The monitoring and promotion of
human rights, for example, is no longer seen as a purely internal matter.
This strengthens the UN’s hand in dealing with recalcitrant governments,
but also creates operational dilemmas. Consider Sudan, where UNAMID
and UNMIS must navigate the difficult terrain of working – and broker-
ing agreements – with a government led by a president against whom an
arrest warrant has been issued by the ICC. Similar dilemmas have arisen in
the DRC, where the government has shown a reluctance to implement its
own ‘zero tolerance’ policy with respect to human rights abuses committed
by the DRC armed forces (FARDC) – including the failure to arrest an
army commander indicted by the ICC.
Even more problematic when it comes to managing consent are democratic
norms. Arguably there is an emerging entitlement to participatory (if not
Western-style democratic) governance in international affairs. Does that
mean that the UN has a responsibility to resist repressive rule, whether by
unelected or elected governments? How hard should it insist on strict
implementation of a mandate that refers to the promotion of democracy
and the rule of law? Tying this to the notion of ‘relational contracts’, per-
haps the peace agreement should be seen not merely as a bargain between
the host government and local elites, but as a social compact with the pop-
ulation as a whole.21 In the DRC, the government and some of its oppo-
nents are finding a way of stabilizing their relations. Does that justify with-
drawing MONUC before legitimate, participatory government institutions
have been established? The dilemma for the UN here and elsewhere is that
the harder it pushes for adherence to basic norms as a matter of principle,
the greater the risk of losing the cooperation of those who hold power.
21. In briefing the UN Security Council, Under-Secretary General LeRoy used the word ‘compact’
to describe the relationship between the UN and DRC.
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How Close to Your Host?
The consent-based nature of peacekeeping means that the UN must pre-
serve a good relationship with the host government. The UN’s poor rela-
tions with the government of Sudan have compromised UNMIS’ ability
to facilitate implementation of the North–South peace agreement. Yet, too
close a relationship can also cause problems. MINURCAT’s proximity to
the government of Chad made it reluctant to resist government obstruc-
tionism. MONUC’s joint operations with the FARDC, one of the greatest
human rights abusers in the country, has undermined the legitimacy of the
mission. UNMIS’ principal role leading to and after the referendum in
early 2011 is to build the capacity of the government of Southern Sudan
(GoSS). While justifiable in the context of North–South relations,
undemocratic tendencies of the GoSS means the UN could be in the posi-
tion of propping up two governments (in the North and in the South) as
they gradually erode the political freedom and space UNMIS was man-
dated to help create.
The problem goes even deeper. In a minimalist view of peacekeeping, the
‘consent’ needed is essentially to allow the peacekeepers to serve as an
impartial referee between the two sides. In a maximalist view, it entails
consent to a significant external role in the transformation of a society. In
Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) has obstructed the ability of
the UN to play either role. It has insisted that the parties deal with most
issues under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement bilaterally, including
matters that must be resolved in the lead-up to and following the referen-
dum, like the border and oil-revenue sharing. Given its inability to engage
the parties directly on core political issues, UNMIS’ strategy for a time was
to press on DDR, SSR, the rule of law and the preparation for elections,
hoping that this would create the conditions for progress on core issues.
But the NCP was deeply resistant to UN pressure or even assistance on
governance and human rights functions, especially when the international
focus shifted to Darfur in 2006.
As Darfur, Chad and Eritrea illustrate, the ‘bargaining’ process can become
farcical. The need for consent, if taken too far, can leave the UN in the posi-
tion of conceding a great deal in order to keep that consent. If it concedes
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too much, one wonders what the bargain is about. All the UN may be
receiving in exchange for the concessions it makes is the right to be there,
without the ability to do anything substantive.
Constructive Withdrawal of Consent: 
Death by a Thousand Cuts
The Capstone Doctrine refers to the de facto withdrawal of consent, when
consent given grudgingly is withheld in various ways, such as restrictions
on freedom of movement.22 The extreme end of this is hostage-taking of
peacekeepers, as seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. More
common is incremental obstruction of the mission, never quite amounting
to a direct challenge to its presence, but debilitating enough to seriously
jeopardize its ability to fulfil the mandate. Thus Eritrea, in response to
Ethiopia’s refusal to accept the decision of the boundary commission,
incrementally imposed restrictions on the UN mission (UNMEE) – first
by banning helicopter observation, then by restricting land patrols and
finally by cutting off all fuel deliveries to troops stationed on its side of the
border. Sudan’s tactics of insisting on African troops, denying visas and
customs delays had a similar impact on the deployment of UNAMID. At
what point does this ‘death by a thousand cuts’ amount to the constructive
withdrawal of strategic consent?
The lesson is that giving in to the government on small matters can be a
slippery slope. The GoS has tested the UN in multiple ways, no more dra-
matically than when it declared Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (SRSG) Jan Pronk persona non grata for posting on his personal
blog that the SAF had lost two major battles in Darfur in September 2006.
This was preceded by an earlier incident when two UNMIS civilian staff
members were declared personae non gratae and kicked out of the country
after attending a human rights rally in Khartoum. The same may be true
of Chad, where a desire not to offend the government meant that MINUR-
CAT was dictated to on a range of issues, from the Status of Forces Agree-
ment to the transfer of EUFOR Chad/CAR sites to the UN peacekeepers.
22. Capstone Doctrine, 32.
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Arguably, compromises made on these issues made it harder for the UN to
push back on the government’s demand for termination of the mission.
Strategies For Managing Consent
Treat Peace Agreements as 
Multiparty Relational Contracts
Comprehensive peace agreements are living documents that should be
interpreted creatively in light of changing circumstances. The lesson is not
to ignore the peace agreement as circumstances change, but rather treat it as
the foundation for an ongoing process of managing relations between the
parties. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was negotiated
between Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) leader John Garang
and Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha. When Garang died and the
idea of ‘making unity attractive’ lost its lustre, the CPA did not become irrel-
evant, but its implementation required a more proactive UN role in pushing
for an inclusive political process, as opposed to relying on the charismatic
leadership and good relations between the architects of the CPA.
If peace agreements are ‘living documents’, then devices for ongoing dispute
settlement and dialogue should be devised as a way of managing consent.
Benchmarks can be used as instruments for engaging the parties in consulta-
tions on progress towards implementation of a mandate. Thus the UN (both
the Secretariat and Security Council) has been pushing for a benchmark-
guided withdrawal from the DRC rather than fixed timelines, and is using
benchmarks as the basis for review and assessments with the government over
the next 12 months.23 Integrated strategic frameworks – now a requirement
wherever UN missions and UN country teams are present -- can serve a sim-
ilar purpose. MONUC and the UN Country Team in the DRC drafted an
Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) in late 2009, with timelines and a divi-
sion of labour. The Congolese government was not satisfied with the
arrangement, so negotiations continue, at the heart of which is the need for
a larger peacebuilding ‘limb’ of the UN presence as an incentive for the gov-
ernment not to force a premature withdrawal of the mission.24
23. Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010), para. 7.
24. Security Council Reports, Monthly Forecast, DRC, April 2010.
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Finally, the notion of relational contracts suggests an expansive vision of
whose consent to a peace process matters. This means an inclusive, deliber-
ative form of political engagement with all stakeholders in the ‘social com-
pact’ that a peace agreement embodies. When and how to cultivate inclusive
politics will vary from place to place (indeed, there is a risk of ‘delegitimiz-
ing’ a government if a peace operation seems to be going around it by engag-
ing directly with the population), but to assume that the only voices that
matter are the signatories to the peace agreement is to overlook a critically
important dimension of contemporary peacekeeping.
Build Leverage to Avoid Premature 
Obsolescence of the Bargain
If the peacekeeping ‘bargain’ tends to obsolesce over time, then devices
should be found for building leverage to avoid premature obsolescence.
Quick-impact projects and peacebuilding assistance can be useful bargain-
ing chips. The government of Chad agreed to a short extension of
MINURCAT to the end of 2010 after the third technical/political assess-
ment mission that visited that year re-affirmed its offer to help with infra-
structure projects like roads and airfields.
Giving the UN a seat in transitional institutions is another way of exercising
leverage. 25 The UN chairs the Implementation Monitoring Committee in
Burundi – composed of the parties to the Arusha Agreement, the AU, EU
and other external actors – to good effect. The Ceasefire Joint Military Com-
mittee in Sudan worked well in part because it was chaired by the UNMIS
Force Commander, who used it proactively to prevent minor skirmishes
from escalating into major crises.26 The Ceasefire Political Commission
worked less well, mainly because the parties to the CPA elected not to use it
and instead decided to address thorny political issues in the NCP-SPLM
Joint Political Committee, without international involvement.27
25. I am grateful to Garth Schofield for highlighting the role of the UN in transitional institutions
as way of managing consent.
26. Bah, S. and I. Johnstone. ‘Sudan: Faltering Protection and Fragile Peace’. in Center on International
Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. New York: New York University, 2007: 34.
27. United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan. S/2006/278, 12 September 2006, para. 14.
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Groups of ‘friends’, contact groups and Security Council missions can also
provide leverage for managing consent, by bringing diplomatic pressure and
offering incentives. They serve as mechanisms for ensuring that ‘difficult gov-
ernments’ do not play multiple mediators and other external actors off against
each other. They are also vehicles for engaging systematically with neighbour-
ing countries that have the ability to either support or disrupt a peace process.
Beware the slippery slope
Managing consent sometimes means being ‘more royalist than the king’.
Standing on principle can be justified on normative as well as pragmatic
grounds. If a peace agreement is a ‘social compact’, then the UN is justified
in insisting on compliance even if the parties themselves are disposed to
accept less than full implementation. Minor violations or obstructions
may seem tolerable in the interest of maintaining a positive relationship
with the host government – but this can be a slippery slope, as the cases of
Eritrea and Darfur have shown.
Conversely, if progress stalls on some issues, that should not stand in the
way of pushing ahead on others, even if they seem peripheral. There are
limits of course – incremental state-building is not possible in the com-
plete absence of consent, as the case of Sudan illustrates. But most cases are
more dynamic, with progress on minor issues serving to buy time or build
confidence for progress on major issues. This can generate the sort of inter-
action that effective management of ‘relational contracts’ requires.
Finally, keeping some political distance from the host government is
important for managing consent. ‘Consent’ as a peacekeeping principle is
not the same as the partnership that development agencies establish with
governments. Rather it is closely tied to the notion of impartiality, under-
stood as even-handed refereeing among the parties and principled applica-
tion of the mandate.28 Deferring to the preferences of the host government
at any price is not managing consent, but abdicating responsibility for
ensuring the mandate is fulfilled in a principled manner. That is not justi-
fiable, in theory or in practice.
28. Capstone Doctrine, See also, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Bra-
himi Report), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, para. 50.
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Expanding and Engaging TCCS and PCCs:
Towards a Capability-driven Approach
Donald C. F. Daniel
This section explicates six propositions about national troop contributions
to peace operations that are relevant to the UN effort to expand contribu-
tors. They are presented didactically and based on previous analyses.1 The
first four identify trends from the last decade. While the past is not pro-
logue, it is safer to assume continuity absent contrary evidence. Doing so
keeps expectations in check.
Troop Contributing Countries
1. Even though there are 192 UN member states and 14 million soldiers
in active service, the number of significant contributors will rarely
exceed 35 and the maximum number of troops 150,000 (excluding US
troops in ISAF) at any one time.
Three reasons undergird this proposition. One is that most countries are
small contributors. About 120 or so provided troops (including military
observers) to peace operations in 2009, but only 34 provided 1000 or
more. A consistent trend of the last decade is that one-fourth to one-
third of contributors provided two-thirds to three-quarters of all troops.
A second reason is that even contributors with large ground forces gen-
1. See Daniel, D.C.F. and L. Caraher. ‘Characteristics of Troop Contributors to Peace Operations
and Implications for Global Capacity’. International Peacekeeping 13, no. 3 2006: 297–315; Daniel,
D. C. F., K. Heuel and B. Margo. ‘Distinguishing Among Military Contributors’, in Daniel,
D.C.F., P. Taft, and S. Wiharta (eds), Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects. Washing-
ton, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008: 27–46; Daniel, D. C. F. ‘Why So Few Troops From
Among So Many’. Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects, 47–62; Daniel, D. C. F. ‘Part-
nering for Troop Supply,’ submitted; and Daniel, D. C. F. ‘Trans-regional Military Dimensions of
Civilian Protection: A Two-Part Problem with a Two-Part Solution’ (forthcoming).
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erally deploy only a small percentage of their troops to peace operations.
In the last decade, the median for unit contributors was 3.6 percent and
the mean 5.3. For every unit deployed, however, most militaries need an
additional three or four earmarked to sustain the commitment; thus the
deployment of 3.6 to 5.3 percent of a country’s soldiers could tie up from
14 to 21 percent of all its ground forces. A third reason is a levelling off
in deployed troop numbers to a high of 165,000. Much of the recent
growth is attributable to the United States increasing its average presence
in ISAF from 11,000 in 2006 to 29,000 in 2009 (climbing to 78,000
today). Hence, an estimated maximum of 150,000 is reasonable since
the 2008 total of 145,000 (minus the USA in ISAF) was at the apogee,
dropping to 130,000 in 2009.
2. Nominal and non-contributors are not especially promising sources
of significant numbers of well-resourced troops for UN operations.
There were 98 unit contributors from 2001 through 2008. From a
review of the size of their ground forces and the overall capability of
their militaries (as measured by spending per personnel), it is clear that
a nation with fewer than 4000 soldiers or that spends less than USD
3000 per personnel has a very small probability to contribute. Applying
these criteria to the 52 nominal and non-contributors of the last decade
leaves us with 34 countries to consider (see Table 1). If one accepts that
countries with small militaries have a low probability of being signifi-
cant contributors, that means that 13 of them can be eliminated. In
addition, yet another 13 have low overall military capability as mea-
sured by personnel spending. Because the UN’s need for well-resourced
units may be even greater than its need for more quantity, these 13 do
not constitute strong candidates. This leaves eight states that have at
least medium-sized forces of medium capability or better – but two are
Israel and Taiwan, countries that would draw considerable objections,
and four others are from the Mideast/ North Africa, a region noted for
the unwillingness of most states to contribute to peacekeeping. Thus,
of the eight, only Angola, Kazakhstan, and Venezuela are left, with the
last possibly drawing objections from the United States. In short, the
prospects here are limited.
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3. Two groups among existing contributors are more promising.
The first encompasses states whose moving averages have shown recent
healthy increases: the USA, China, Bangladesh, Egypt, Rwanda, and
Burundi. Whether they will continue to increase remains to be seen,
but the USA can be discounted as a UN contributor. A second group
consists of states that have evidenced a willingness to be important con-
tributors in the recent past and, if approached, might be induced to
return to levels they had earlier achieved. The most interesting in this
regard are the members of a cross-cutting cluster of states identified
under proposition (5).
4. From a global perspective, troop-unit contributors fall into three
groups: a UN cluster (UNC), a cross-cutting ‘Western’ agendas clus-
ter (CCAC), and a third ‘mixed bag.’
The UN cluster is a cohesive group of 34 countries, nearly all of whom
since 2001 have contributed only through the UN (Table 2 lists this and
the other groups.) The organization itself seemed to be the magnet draw-
ing them together. A second cluster consisted of 31 countries whose indi-
vidual choices in this decade as to where to go and under what auspices
seem to complement one another with the collective result cutting across
organizations and regions. This cross-cutting ‘Western’ agendas cluster
(CCAC) involved deployments of troops to NATO, EU, and ad hoc coa-
lition missions mainly in Europe, the Mideast, and South Asia. Finally,
there is a ‘mixed bag’ of 33, mostly modest, contributors. Because the
term ‘cluster’ implies centripetal pull among the entities in the cluster, it
is best not to apply it to this third group. They are not birds of a feather,
but vary widely as to their provenance, operational experience, and the
size and quality of their militaries.
5. If projections about Western forces drawing down from Afghani-
stan in 2011 come to pass, then the CCAC countries minus the
United States would seem a highly attractive group to approach in
light of their overall military capabilities and previous peace opera-
tions experience.
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Each has at least medium capability and a medium-sized ground force with
high operational experience, except for Georgia, Japan, Norway, Thailand,
and South Korea. Further, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey are either been
past members of the ‘UN Fire Brigade’ or have exhibited a willingness to par-
ticipate in at least one UN mission since 2001.
6. Whether or not the UN attracts highly capable CCA states, it should
partner nations together to fill a critical capability gap: the formation
of Standing High Readiness mission-planning and headquarters Bat-
talions (SHIRBATs) to serve as the initial elements of missions involv-
ing several thousand people.
Modelled on the now defunct and more ambitious Standby High Readi-
ness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a SHIRBAT would draw its personnel from
individual nations. Prior to any contingency, contributors would famil-
iarize themselves with one another and with each other’s militaries, with
UN procedures, and with common UN-provided communications and
information-management equipment. They would hash out procedures,
exercise and train together, and be part of UN evaluation teams sent out
in anticipation of a mission. With a specific mission in mind and in
coordination with the Military Advisor and the other deploying nations,
they would formulate rules of engagement. Beyond being part of the
headquarters, each SHIRBAT member would deploy at least a battalion
as part of the first tactical or support troops on the ground. A SHIRBAT
would deploy long enough to give the UN time to assemble a follow-on
headquarters team.
Table 3 lists countries (names and scores are highlighted in grey color)
which should probably be approached by the Secretary-General and Mili-
tary Advisor to join the initial SHIRBAT. Several criteria drove the
choices. One is that the effort should focus on the 10 to 15 states necessary
to provide it sufficient critical mass to deploy one SHIRBAT since some
of the states generically willing to join a SHIRBAT may demur from
deploying to a specific operation. Other criteria were applied to specific
states.
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• Look for regional representation.
• Favour Francophone countries because the UN has requested this char-
acteristic.
• Restrict the list to countries whose 2001–08 contributions were above
the median for all contributors.
• Favour states that provided UN force commanders since 2001.
• Exclude CCAC countries because many UN contributors see them as
having too much clout
• Seek out countries whose culture (e.g., Islamic) or language beyond
French (e.g., Spanish or Portuguese) could prove significant.
On the basis of these decision rules, 18 states seem initially attractive part-
ners. From South Asia are Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan; from Africa are
Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa; from North Africa and the
Mideast are Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia: from South America
are Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay; from Europe/Eurasia are Austria and
Ukraine and from East Asia and the Pacific are China and Indonesia.
Conclusion
In sum, the ‘New Horizon’ project calls for engaging and expanding new con-
tributors, but if the analysis above is on target, there is little prospect for
expansion or, for that matter, for increasing troop numbers. The UN should
concentrate on two goals: increasing the availability of countries with
medium to high overall military capabilities and the availability of quick-
response lead elements. Consistent with the first goal it should in particular
approach CCAC states as they draw down from Afghanistan (presumably in
2011). Consistent with the second goal, it should make the effort to form
Standing High Readiness Battalions. This analysis has attempted to suggest
states that the UN should engage as it pursues each goal.
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Table 1. Ground Force Size (GFS) and Overall Military Capability (OMC) of Nominal
and Non-Contributors
High OMC Medium OMC Low OMC
Large GFS None Algeria
Angola
Israel
Taiwan
Iran
Mexico
Myanmar
Syria
Vietnam
Medium GFS Oman
Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Venezuela
Armenia
Belarus
Cuba
Ecuador
Lebanon
Libya
Yemen
Zimbabwe
Small GFS Bahrain
Kuwait
Brunei
Cyprus
Serbia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cote d’Ivoire
Kyrgyzstan
Madagascar
Paraguay
Tajikistan
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Table 2 Three ‘global’ groups 
34 UN 31 CCWA 33 Other
Argentina* Albania Burundi
Bangladesh* Australia Rwanda
Benin Belgium Sudan
Bolivia* Bulgaria Tanzania
Brazil Canada Uganda
Cambodia* Czech Chad
Chile Denmark Congo
China, PR* Finland Moldova
Egypt* Georgia Russia
Ethiopia Germany Azerbaijan
Ghana Greece Croatia
Guatemala* Hungary Dom Rep
Guinea-Bis. Italy El Salvador
Guinea Japan Estonia
India* Lithuania Honduras
Indonesia* Malaysia Latvia
Jordan* Netherlands Macedonia
Kenya New Zealand Nicaragua
Malawi Norway Fiji
Namibia Poland Gabon
Nepal* Portugal Gambia, The
Niger Romania Mali
Nigeria Singapore Mozambique
Pakistan* Slovenia South Africa
Peru* South Korea Colombia
Philippines* Spain Switzerland
Senegal Sweden UAE
Slovakia Thailand Austria
Sri Lanka* Turkey France
Togo United Kingdom Ireland
Tunisia* United States Mongolia
Uruguay* Morocco
Zambia Ukraine
Qatar **
* indicates a UN ‘Global’ state     ** Qatar is a special case
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Table 3. Potential SHIRBAT Contributors 
Country G
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India 3 2 3 2 3 13  Yes
Bangladesh 3 1 3 2 3 12  Yes
Pakistan 3 1 3 2 3 12  Yes
South Africa 2 2 3 2 3 12  Yes
Morocco 3 1 3 2 3 12 Yes  
China, PR 3 2 2 2 3 12  Yes
Austria 2 3 2 3 2 12  Yes
Nepal 2 1 3 2 3 11  Yes
Uruguay 1 1 3 3 3 11  Yes
Jordan 2 1 3 2 3 11  Yes
Brazil 3 2 2 2 2 11  Yes
Argentina 2 2 2 3 2 11   
Nigeria 2 1 3 1 3 10  Yes
Ghana 1 1 3 2 3 10  Yes
Ethiopia 3 1 2 1 3 10   
Ukraine 3 1 2 2 2 10   
Sri Lanka 3 1 2 2 2 10   
Kenya 1 2 2 1 3 9   Yes
Egypt 3 1 1 2 2 9 Yes  
Tunisia 2 1 2 2 2 9 Yes  
Indonesia 3 1 1 2 2 9   
Senegal 1 1 2 1 3 8 Yes Yes
Rwanda 2 1 2 1 2 8 Yes Yes
Namibia 1 2 1 2 2 8   
Benin 1 1 2 1 2 7 Yes Yes
Zambia 1 1 2 1 2 7   
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Civilian Capacities in UN Peace Operations
Cedric de Coning
One of the most significant, but often overlooked, developments in the
UN is the transformation from military- to civilian-focused peace mis-
sions.1 This change has come about as the mandates shifted from monitor-
ing military ceasefires to supporting the implementation of comprehensive
peace agreements. As these missions became more oriented towards peace-
building, the role of civilians became more central, the number of civilian
functions increased, and the role of civilians shifted from a peripheral sup-
port role to the core of contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding
missions. Civilians now represent approximately 20% of all UN peace-
keepers and peacebuilders. As of 28 February 2010, the UN had almost
22,000 civilians deployed, including approximately 8,200 international
staff, of which 2,400 were UN volunteers.2
The UN now deploys more civilian peacekeepers than all the other multilat-
eral institutions combined. At the beginning of 2010, the EU had deployed
approximately 2,000 civilian personnel; the Organization for Security
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) approximately 3,000, and the AU) was
deploying approximately 50 civilians in its current operation in Somalia.
There is a misperception that the global South is under-represented in
civilian posts within UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. In
fact, of the top 20 nations from which civilian expertise is recruited (con-
1. The author wishes to acknowledge the editorial support of Walter Lotze and Andreas Øien Sten-
sland from NUPI, as well as very useful comments and suggestions from the UN Civilian Capac-
ity Review team in the UN Peacebuilding Support Office.
2. All peacekeeping related statistics in this paper, unless otherwise indicated, are based on the
UNDPKO-DPI. United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, March 2010, http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/dpko/factsheet.pdf (accessed on 16 June 2010), or on correspondence with DPKO
and PBSO in June 2010.
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tributing 49.8% of civilian expertise to UN missions), 31.1% are from the
South.3 For example, 40% of civil affairs officers in UN missions are
drawn from Africa, as against14% from the Americas (excluding the
USA), 10% from Asia and 3% from Oceania. A total of 67% of civil affairs
officers in UN missions come from the global South. Approximately 20%
of all civil affairs officers are UN volunteers.
In comparison to UN peace operations, the number of civilians in African
peace operations has, to date, been rather limited. There were approxi-
mately 50 civilian staff in the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), compared
to the 1,134 international civilian staff, 419 UN Volunteers and 2,557
national civilian staff in the current African Union-United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The ongoing African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) had approximately 33 international staff
and 15 national staff as of November 2009.
However, we find a relatively high percentage of Africans in UN peace oper-
ations. There were 9 African countries among the top 20 contributors of
international civilian staff to UN missions in 2009: 2nd Kenya (4.8%), 7th
Ghana (2.9%), 8th Sierra Leone (2.7%), 10th Ethiopia (2.3%), 11th Nigeria
(2.2%), 14th Uganda (1.7%), 15th Cameroon (1.6%), 17th Tanzania (1.5%)
and 18th Cote d’Ivoire (1.3%). In addition to the international staff, in 2009
the UN employed 15,442 national professional and general service staff in
UN missions, and of these 10,109, or approximately 75%, were Africans.4
Recruitment and Deployment Challenges
The UN finds it difficult to identify candidates in certain specialized cat-
egories, including security sector reform and judicial and prison manage-
ment. This is partly a function of the availability of these skills in the mar-
ketplace in general. To deal with this problem the DPKO has proposed
the enhancement of the existing Standing Police Capacity to include jus-
tice and corrections specialists.
3. See 2010 Annual Review of Peace Operations. New York: Center for International Cooperation, 2010.
4. Ibid.
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In general, however, UN experience shows that a basic assumption in the
civilian capacity debate – namely, that there is a worldwide shortage of
civilian expertise – is flawed. The UN receives more than 150,000 appli-
cations per year for its civilian peacekeeping field positions.5 This means
that the UN receives approximately 1,500 applications for every civilian
position advertised, of which approximately 50 are qualified for consider-
ation for the position.6
Despite the large number of people eager to serve in UN missions, the UN
suffers from high vacancy rates in its missions. The average vacancy rate of
international civilian staff for UN operations between 2005 and 2008 has
been around 22%.7 In some missions the figures are much higher, espe-
cially during the start-up phase. UNAMID had a vacancy rate of 56% in
2008, UNMIS had a vacancy rate of 40% in 2005, and the UN Mission
in Afghanistan had a vacancy rate of 42% at the beginning of 2010.8
That it takes approximate 200 days for the UN recruitment system to fill
a vacancy indicates that the system is too slow and bureaucratic, and clearly
not designed for the rapid deployment needs of the peacekeeping and pea-
cebuilding missions context.9 Despite the large number of applicants,
there are also persistent complaints from within the system about the qual-
ity and appropriateness of those who are short-listed for selection.
A main challenge facing the UN is processing the large number of appli-
cations it receives, selecting the most suitable candidates, and the time it
takes to process an application from the moment a vacancy is announced
until a person is deployed to take up the post.
5. Gourlay, C. Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations, a DPKO Lessons
Learned Study. New York: United Nations, 2006: 6.
6. Durch, W.J., Strengthening UN Secretariat Capacity for Civilian Post-Conflict Response, article pre-
pared for the Center on International Cooperation and the Government of Denmark’s Meeting on
Strengthening the UN’s Capacity on Civilian Crisis Management, Copenhagen, 8–9 June 2004: 9.
7. Solli, A., B. de Carvalho, C. de Coning, and M.F. Pedersen. Bottlenecks to Deployment: The Chal-
lenges of Deploying Civilian Personnel to Peace Operations, Security in Practice 3, Oslo: Norwegian
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2009: 10.
8. UNAMA Fact Box, Kabul: United Nations, 2010.
9. See Low-Level Panel. Practical Steps to a More Effective and Efficient United Nations, New York:
United Nations, 2004: 5, www.lowlevelpanel.org.
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Several recent reports and studies have focused on these problems, high-
lighting the need to further strengthen the civilian contribution to peace-
keeping and peacebuilding missions.10 However, the UN’s recruitment
approach seems to have overcome many of the dilemmas experienced by
the EU and others. Because the UN does not rely on secondments, it has
no problems attracting staff from the smaller and less developed countries.
As mentioned, 60% of the top 20 civilian contributing countries are from
the global South.11 The same phenomenon seems to apply to gender. The
UN has a higher proportion of women in peace operations than most of
its member states have in their civil service. Currently, approximately 30%
of the civilians in UN peace operations are female, but there are still dis-
appointingly few women in senior positions.12
Training and Rostering Challenges
The training of civilians should occur before recruitment, in preparation
for deployment, on joining a mission (induction training), and following
deployment (in-mission). Some training institutions, like the African Cen-
tre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), are increas-
ingly focusing on in-mission training aimed at sharpening skills needed in
particular contexts or to address new needs not previously addressed.13 All
new civilian UN staff now also undergo generic induction training at the
UN training centre in Brindisi before deployment. Most missions offer an
induction course for all new staff upon entering a new mission. This will
typically be conducted by the mission’s training cell, but there have been
cases where these courses have also been conducted by civilian training
10. In addition to those already mentioned, see also: Chandran, R., J. Sherman, B. Jones, B, S. For-
man, A. Le More & A. Hart. Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations: Status, Gaps and
Options, New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2009; UN Secretary General. Report
of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881-S/
2009/304, New York: United Nations, 2009, and UNDPKO-DFS. A New Partnership Agenda:
Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, New York: United Nations, 2009.
11. Statistics obtained from Civil Affairs in UN DPKO, May 2010.
12. DPKO Fact Sheet, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/factsheet.pdf (accessed on 16 June 2010).
13. ACCORD (www.accord.org.za) has conducted Conflict Management for Peacekeepers and Pea-
cebuilders Courses in AMISOM, MINURCAT, MONUC, ONUCI, UNAMID, UNMIL and
UNMIS since 2008, and Civil–Military Coordination Courses in AMIS, AMISOM, MONUC
and UNMIS since 2006.
0000 100817 GRMAT B#4BD29E.book  Page 51  Wednesday, October 20, 2010  10:21 AM
52 Cedric de Coning
centres, as has been done by ACCORD for AMISOM and by Scuola
Superiore Sant’Anna for OSCE missions.
The civilian training centres coordinate their work with each other through
international and regional associations, and there is a good degree of coop-
eration and coordination underway among the civilian training commu-
nity.14 However, the same cannot be said for the relationship between
training and UN recruitment. The linkages between training institutions,
rosters and the UN recruitment system are both under-developed and
under-explored.
Standby rosters are often seen as an obvious solution to the civilian capac-
ity gap. The idea is that individuals are pre-trained, pre-identified and
placed on a standby roster, and that they are then ready to be deployed
when the need arises. Reality has, however, proven more complex. There
are several different types of rosters. A standing capacity has staff who are
employed on a full-time basis, with the express purpose of being available
as a surge capacity when the need arises. A standby capacity consists of per-
sons pre-identified to be deployed when the need arises, usually within a
specified time-frame. Finally, a rostered capacity operates as a database of
potential candidates who can be approached and their suitability assessed
as the need arises.15 There exist several such rosters, most of them either
national rosters or civil society based.16
In the UN civilian capacity context there is a tension between calls for the
development of more civilian rosters on the one hand, whilst on the other,
the General Assembly resolutions that have restricted the use of gratis per-
14. Coordination occurs through the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers
(www.iaptc.org) and, for instance in Africa, through the African Peace Support Trainer’s Asso-
ciation (www.apsta.org).
15. For example, CANADEM, a national NGO roster of Canadians, has around 15,000 persons in
its database, and RedR, an international NGO roster specializing in engineering in emergencies,
has approximately 20,000 candidates. See Catriona, 2006: 14.
16. Australia’s new Deployable Civilian Capacity, the United Kingdom’s Stabilization Unit roster,
and the German Peace Operation Centre (ZIF) would be examples of national rosters, whilst
examples of civil-society rosters include the Norwegian Refugee Council’s NORCAPS, CANA-
DEM, and the African Civilian Standby Roster for International Humanitarian and Peacekeep-
ing Missions (AFDEM).
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sonnel in UN missions seem to have resulted in a general policy in the UN
Secretariat to not work with rosters.17 The concerns behind these policies
are understandable and need to be addressed, but cooperating with rosters
need not have a negative impact on the UN’s recruitment policies. Most
UN agencies do cooperate with rosters, without negative consequences.
Rosters provide a complementary pool of potential candidates that the UN
can consider, especially for those categories of personnel difficult to hire on
the open market, but the choice and management of personnel remains
with the UN. The purpose of investing in a roster – shortening the time it
will take to fill an urgently needed post – is not understood within the cur-
rent relationship between the UN and rosters.
Conclusion and Recommendations
A main challenge facing the UN is processing the large number of appli-
cations it receives, selecting the most suitable candidates, and finally, the
time needed to process an application from when a vacancy is announced
until a person is deployed to take up the post.
The UN Secretary-General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding provides a solid
basis for engagement between the UN and the international peace opera-
tions training and rostering community. The UN Peacebuilding Support
Office (PBSO) has initiated a UN system-wide review of civilian capacity,
expected to be completed by the first quarter of 2011.
The review should provide a solid basis for engagement between the UN
and the international peace operations training and rostering community.
The civilian capacity challenge in UN peacekeeping operations needs
focused and sustained attention. The current level of focus on this chal-
lenge by both DPKO/DFS and the General Assembly has not managed to
improve the situation. What is needed is a much higher level of concen-
trated political and technical attention to this challenge.
It is thus proposed that a global civilian capacity partnership be estab-
lished – one that can bring together the international training and ros-
17. General Assembly Resolutions 51/243, 15 September 1997, and 52/234, 26 June 1998.
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tering community, the relevant UN agencies and the Secretariat, and
interested UN member states, with the aim of meaningfully increasing
the intensity and focus of the international community on the civilian
capacity challenge in UN peacekeeping operations. The objective of the
partnership should be to significantly improve the UN Secretariat’s abil-
ity to identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel
within a reasonable time-frame, and without adverse side-effects on the
local community or mission mandate.
Furthermore, the following steps should be taken by the UN Secretariat,
the member states and the training and rostering community to deal with
the civilian capacity challenges faced by the United Nations:
Steps that can be taken by the United Nations
The primary focus of the UN Secretariat should be on improving the UN
recruitment system, with the aim of reducing the time it takes to hire new
staff, and bettering internal standing capacities and rosters. It also needs to
improve the quality of the personnel delivered to the field. The focus
should thus be on addressing these shortcomings, rather than on develop-
ing new rosters and rapid-deployment systems that require considerable
time and resources, and have a poor track record of success.
The current UN initiatives (Civilian Capacity Review and Recruit-
ment System Reform) could benefit from increased and sustained
member-state attention and support. Civilian capacity needs to be
transformed, from being an internal technical issue to a strategic part-
nership issue. Clear benchmarks need to be identified, and the UN
Secretariat needs to be given the resources necessary to achieve those
benchmarks. Interested member states could create a ‘Friends-of-Civil-
ian Capacity’ entity that can ensure there is sustained and focused
attention on this issue and that the Secretariat is supported in a system-
atic and coordinated manner.
The UN Secretariat needs to be encouraged to enter into meaningful rela-
tionships with the training and rostering institutions, because they repre-
sent existing capacities that can be made available to UN peacekeeping and
peacebuilding operations.
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Steps that can be taken by member states
The concerns of the global South need to be addressed. Initiatives in the
North could be paired with initiatives in the South with the aim of ensur-
ing a fair and equitable supply. UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mis-
sions could benefit from more civilian personnel from the South with cul-
tural, linguistic and applied skill-sets that are appropriately matched with
the societies hosting such missions.
Steps that can be taken by the Training and 
Rostering Community
There exist several institutions that specialize in civilian peacekeeping
training and that are organized within the context of the International
Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). And there are
several international rosters that have been successfully providing civilian
personnel to UN agencies and NGOs. These organizations are willing to
support the UN to strengthen the linkages between training, rostering and
recruitment. The training and rostering communities could establish
closer working relations with each other, and with the UN Secretariat,
with a view to exploring how they could cooperate to strengthen the UN’s
civilian capacity.
For training institutions, there is a good global spread. Most civilian train-
ing centres and most rosters, however, seem to be clustered in the North.
More can be done to encourage the development of civilian training and
rostering in the global South.
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Accountability and Credibility:
Assessing Host Population Perceptions and 
Expectations
Michael Pugh
‘La liberté, c’est la possibilité d’être et non l’obligation d’être’
René Magritte
Critical analysis of the impact of peace operations on local populations has
not been in short supply since François Débrix published his critique in
1997.1 But students of peace operations had to wait until 2004 – when
Béatrice Pouligny published Ils nous avaient promis la paix – for the first
in-depth fieldwork to provide a substantial and wide-ranging study of the
perceptions of peace missions among local populations.2 This was followed
in 2009 by another sociological critique, Paul Higate’s and Marsha
Henry’s Insecure Spaces, which focused on Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo. This
contends that because international interventions are framed by the exer-
cise of power, interventionists shape perceptions to create inconsistent
effects, a mix of secure and insecure spaces.3
At the level of what might be called ‘in-house’ field surveys, the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has conducted ‘early warning’
and public opinion surveys for many years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
1. Debrix, F. (Re-)envisioning Peacekeeping: The United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press Borderlines Series, 1997.
2. Subsequently published in English as: Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local
People. London: Hurst, 2006. The French have been pioneers in other spheres. See for example,
the first study of the political economies of post-Cold War conflicts: Jean, F. and J.-C.Rufin
(eds.). L’économie des Guerres Civiles, Paris: Hachette, 1996.
3. Higate, P. and M. Henry, Insecure Spaces: Peacekeeping, power and performance in Haiti, Kosovo
and Liberia, London: Zed Book, 2009.
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has sponsored one among youth in Kosovo in 2009–10. Jean Krasno led a
team for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in Liberia
in 2006 which found overwhelming majorities in support of the view that
the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) had improved the secu-
rity situation there and that the behaviour of peacekeepers had been good
or very good.4 Opinion surveys supported by the governments of the
United Kingdom and of Norway have also been conducted by the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in south Lebanon since
2007. The central purpose was not to involve the population in making
decisions about the ‘good life’ but ‘to increase the UNIFIL’s capacity to tar-
get its community messaging and communication activities, partly in order
to enhance good relations with the communities’.5 In addition, the Peace-
building Commission has been mandated to consult civil society in coun-
tries it has focused upon, and the World Bank has funded ‘consultancies’
with local populations in advising on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers,
or PRSPs.6 Nevertheless, consolidated critical debate appears to have been
lacking, and the issue of local impact and perceptions seems not to have
gathered pace in practitioner forums until about the mid-2000s. A change
may be afoot – perhaps reflecting the crisis that the liberal peace has
entered, not least because of the inability to accord locals with agency.7
Indeed, the lacuna may testify to echoes of imperialism in peace missions.
From interviews with ‘peace mission’ personnel that claim to ‘speak for the
subaltern’, academics investigating the approach of a range of institutions,
including the UN, NATO, the EU and the Arab League, contend that this
disguises arrogance and censorship and an amazing lack of concern. A
4. Krasno, J. ‘External Study: Public Opinion Survey of UNMIL’s Work in Liberia, conducted in Jan-
uary 2006’, DPKO, March 2006, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2006.nsf/FilesByRWDo-
cUNIDFileName/EGUA-6QSMA9-dpko-lbr-31mar.pdf/$File/dpko-lbr-31mar.pdf ). However,
survey questions were skewed to provide positive answers: Higate and Henry, Insecure Spaces, 2.
5. DPKO, UNIFIL report.
6. However, as Pablo Leal contends, ‘the mantra of participation served not to facilitate the agency
of the poor and reduce their subjugation by the state and its international backers, but to create
‘a populist justification for the removal of the state from the economy and its substitution by the
market’. Leal, P. A. ‘Participation: the ascendancy of a buzzword in the neo-liberal era’, Develop-
ment in Practice 17, No. 4–5, 2007: 539–48, at 541.
7. See Cooper, N. ‘On the Crisis of the Liberal Peace’, Conflict, Security & Development 7, no. 4,
2007: 605–16; Cooper, Neil, Mandy Turner and Michael Pugh ‘The end of history and the last
liberal peacebuilder: a reply to Roland Paris’. Review of International Studies, forthcoming.
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scandalous example of censorship was the UNDP-commissioned Arab
Human Development Report of 2009, which leading Middle East aca-
demic contributors boycotted or withdrew from after a UNDP Advisory
Board had doctored the report to downplay the instabilities arising from
the foreign occupation of Iraq and Israel’s occupation of Palestinian terri-
tories.8 If academics could be treated in this way, it suggests a serious flaw
in taking wider local views into account, even though a crisis prevention
and recovery report, also UNDP-sponsored, had already emphasized the
importance of local agency.9
Processes and policies in international administrations can reach the status
of organized hypocrisy. In an extraordinarily frank admission when com-
paring his time as a UK MP during Prime Minister Thatcher’s tenure in
power with his time as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Paddy Ashdown revealed:
Ironically, as a politician I campaigned against many of her reforms,
arguing that they would lead to lost jobs and the selling off of the
national wealth; only to find myself instituting very similar reforms
in Bosnia and facing the same arguments and opposition. What
makes matters worse in most post-conflict countries is that they are
poor, not rich – so the pain can be far greater. There is not much the
interveners can do about this, except understand it and recognise that
by insisting on accelerated reforms we are often asking local politi-
cians to take responsibility for a level of social disruption which our
own politicians at home would reject without a second thought.10
8. The Dutch referred to this as ‘controversial editing’ – a bit like calling a beheading a facelift. Turner,
Mandy. ‘Creating ‘partners for peace’: the Palestinian Authority and the International Statebuild-
ing Agenda’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, forthcoming 2010; Kawzally, S. ‘The Politics
of the UNDP Arab Human Development Report’, Monthly Review, 10 August 2009, http://
mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/kawzally100809.html ; Richmond, O. ‘The Romanticisation of
the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding’, International Spectator 44, no.1, 2009: 149–69.
9. UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Post-Conflict Economic Recovery: Enabling
Local Ingenuity, New York: United Nations, 2008.
10. Ashdown, P. Swords and Ploughshares: Bringing Peace to the 21st Century. London: Weidenfeld &
Nicholson, 2007.
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This article is now divided into two further parts: on some of the variables
affecting legitimacy and host perceptions; and an estimation of what local
communities often appear to want.
Relevant Variables
First, the nature of the war and of ‘peace’ to be kept (or whether it exists
only in part) has a bearing on legitimacy. An occupation or ‘victor’s peace’
is, by definition, coercive, top–down and liable to engender political resis-
tance. Relief operations seem to enjoy greater acceptability than longer-
term statebuilding efforts. Despite anger at distributional inequities in
relief operations, the main basis for hostility is the insufficiency of provi-
sion, not objections to the relief operation as such. Other forms of peace
(‘conservative’, ‘orthodox’ and ‘emancipatory’, in Oliver Richmond’s
typology), have different impacts.11 In a victor’s or conservative peace cap-
italizing on ‘robust’ peacekeeping or warrior attributes, the tendency has
been for military, civilian and even NGOs to reside in colonial encamp-
ments insulated from the population. The ‘Green Zone’ in Baghdad is per-
haps an extreme non-UN example, but the pressure on UN agencies to
conform to insurance conditions and certification requirements has a con-
siderable influence on the level of involvement with host societies.12 So
too, will the degree of local dependence on externals, with the Palestinian
National Authority (PNA) a clear example of the control exercised by
donors, as well as Israel, on the ‘peacebuilding’ process since the Oslo
Accords. The process served to hobble PNA control of economic policy,
marginalizing and excluding sections of Palestinian society.13
Second, encounters with local civilians may give rise to high local expecta-
tions (examined further below). The foreign military forces have weapons
and money. Not unreasonably, the local population will expect these
forces to be able to offer both security/protection and financial assistance.
In many cases they can offer neither. That is bound to cause frustration
11. Richmond, O. The Transformation of Peace, London: Palgrave, 2005.
12. Duffield, M. ‘The Fortified Aid Compound: Risk Management, Security Training and
Urban Pathology’. University of Bristol, unpublished paper: http://74.125.155.132/
scholar?q=cache:iyiStSyImU0J:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as_sdt=2000
13. Turner, ‘Creating ‘partners for peace’’.
0000 100817 GRMAT B#4BD29E.book  Page 59  Wednesday, October 20, 2010  10:21 AM
60 Michael Pugh
among the local population.14 It can also cause the foreigners to view the
locals as ungrateful.15 Expectations may outstretch the ability of external
actors to fulfil them. What constitutes security is open to wide interpreta-
tion. This seems to apply, in particular, to supposedly ‘reformed’ post-con-
flict police forces, which locals often have considerable difficulty in trust-
ing.16 Locally-supported vigilantes may well have greater legitimacy than
the forces of a reconstructed state that is either virtually meaningless (as in
Serb areas of Kosovo and in Pacific territories), or regarded as the source
of abuse. Whereas a ‘reformed police’ in, say, Bosnia and Herzegovina or
El Salvador might be seen by internationals as a solution to security
threats, local communities may take a completely contrary view of what
those security forces represent. Furthermore, local political elites com-
monly re-code threats for their own purposes – as ARENA did in El Sal-
vador, where politically-motivated violence, and violence correlated with
an economic agenda, was re-coded as ordinary crime to underpin a dis-
course that the country was being ‘normalized’.17
Third, the asymmetries of power between peace missions and locals provoke
tension. The arrivistes have the wealth, the vehicles, computers and access to the
outside world. ‘War tourism’ and exploitation can accompany an international
presence and even, it has been suggested, pave the way for a sex tourism indus-
try.18 Of course these may be labelled ‘unintended consequences’, but hege-
monic masculinities also have the effect of promoting exploitative engage-
ments.19 In extreme cases, lack of respect has led to alienation, as with
Canadians and Italians in Somalia.20 In addition, foreigners have a secret
14. Haarland, T.L. ‘Still Homeland Defenders at Heart? Military Culture in International Deploy-
ments’, International Peacekeeping 17, no.4 (forthcoming, 2010).
15. Ibid., citing Bård Mæland. Skadeskutt idealisme. Norsk offisersmoral i Kosovo [Idealism shot down.
Morale among Norwegian officers in Kosovo]. Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004.
16. See, Moodie, E. El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace: Crime, Uncertainty and the Transition to
Democracy, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.
17. Ibid.
18. Jennings, K. ‘Unintended Consequences of Intimacy: Political Economies of Peacekeeping and
Sex Tourism’, International Peacekeeping 17, no.2, 2010: 229–43.
19. 30–40% of Norwegian soldiers revealed that they had bought sex on peacekeeping deployments
in the 1980s, though these figures should be treated with caution and appear to be falling, See
Haarland, 2010.
20. Sion, L. ‘Dutch Peacekeepers and Host Environments in the Balkans: An Ethnological Perspec-
tive’, International Peacekeeping 15, no. 2, 2008: 201–13.
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weapon: immunity.21 Of course there are codes of conduct and cultural sensi-
tivity training of peace mission personnel, and measures to deal with wrongdo-
ing. But these safeguards and systems are not evident to locals, who simply see
misbehaviour unpunished. The UN has limited power in this regard, such as
sending a unit home. In peacebuilding administrations, accountability to local
legal processes can sometimes be evaded by appeals to immunity, as the EU’s
Joly Dixon did with regard to a tax distribution dispute between the Bosnian
Federation and Republika Srpska. Apparently, the EU Commission’s Privatiza-
tion Agency in Kosovo destroyed records before handing over to the local gov-
ernment. Furthermore, in multinational/international missions the complexity
of legal responsibility for malpractice can seem to work against local communi-
ties, because of the costs of counsel and problems of travelling to trials.
Fourth, there are significant variables affecting perceptions that arise from
the particular composition and behaviour of security forces, and of civil-
ians engaged in peacebuilding and NGOs. There is now a growing sociol-
ogy and ethnography of military components in peace missions. It has
been argued that, for example, because soldiers come into daily contact
with the host population, the degree of investment in ‘warrior culture’ and
cultural attitudes to ‘the Other’ are crucially important factors in deter-
mining local legitimacy.22 It can make sense to have a predominance of
language and religious affinity with the local population, as evidenced by
Latin American leadership of missions in Nicaragua and Haiti, and Mus-
lim peacekeepers in Bosniak areas of Bosnia, for example, though there is
no guarantee that this will ensure legitimacy. An increase in female peace-
keepers in the past ten years is said to make operations more conducive to
wider acceptance, because local women feel more comfortable dealing with
females in authority. But the percentage of females in the international
security sector remains tiny at about 2% (in the civilian sector about 30%),
and the role-playing notionally assigned to women creates an essentialism
that few feminists are comfortable with. Admittedly, some findings show
21. Tondini, M. ‘Putting an End to Human Rights Violations by Proxy: Accountability of Interna-
tional Organizations and Member States in the Framework of Jus Post Bellum’, in Stahn, C. and
J.K. Kleffner (eds), Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, The
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008: 187–212.
22. Sion, L. ‘Dutch Peacekeepers and Host Environments in the Balkans: An Ethnological Perspec-
tive’. International Peacekeeping 15, no.2, 2008: 201–13.
0000 100817 GRMAT B#4BD29E.book  Page 61  Wednesday, October 20, 2010  10:21 AM
62 Michael Pugh
such a homogenized perception of the components of missions, whether
in or out of uniform, that they are lumped together as ‘whites’, ‘foreigners
on tour’, ‘united holidays’ (vacaciones unidas) and less flattering terms.23
Other evidence points to the ability of locals to discriminate in their deal-
ings, playing off foreign agencies or individuals against each other to
achieve their own ends.24 There may also be a correlation between accept-
ability ratings and length of stay: the longer a mission is in place, the fewer
mistakes are tolerated, as the foreigners outstay their welcome.
What Hosts Want
It is therefore worth a reminder that locals have agency. It is, of course,
erroneous to confuse perceptions with outcomes. But in so far as the out-
comes of peace missions produce unintended consequences and ‘hybridi-
ties’ that fall short of mission goals, outcomes reflect local adaptations,
mimicry, mockery and resistances. That is to say locals do not simply
accept what the interlopers serve up. They resist or incorporate external
policies into their own agendas. Engagement with local agendas and nego-
tiation on the basis of unprivileged imposition is therefore an essential
component of sustainable peace.
There are also differences in perceptions, reactions and resistances according
to gender, age, location and benefits. Women have been prominent in estab-
lishing survival and coping mechanisms during and after conflict, and have
been instrumental in assisting peace processes, but they are often marginal-
ized in peacebuilding. One of the few women to be taken on as a minister in
Kosovo’s interim government, Vjosa Dobruna, leader of an NGO Centre
for Women and Children and Co-Administrator for the Department of
Democratic Governance and Civil Society, writes about her resignation:
I sent an open letter saying I was leaving because there was no real
partnership between the international community and Kosovars,
and because women were being prevented from taking part in
reconstruction – which was their right and responsibility. The ideal
23. Pouligny, ix.
24. Pouligny.
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model for transferring power to the local people had, in my opin-
ion, failed in practice.25
Young people may be drawn to radical resistance by marginalization
and lack of opportunities, as youths in Palestinian refugee camps were
drawn to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.26 By contrast, those living around
‘secure spaces’, a foreign base for example, may benefit from foreign
spending of allowances and employment opportunities.27 Capital cities
generally benefit more in this respect than provincial and remote areas.
Moreover, a coincidence of interests can emerge in peacebuilding
between the neo-liberal agendas of donors and local war entrepreneurs
who capture state assets for private profit, or who are adopted by the
externals as part of a globalized elite or ‘parachuted in’ as reliable cli-
ents of neo-liberal governance.28
In other words, students and practitioners have to be careful to disaggre-
gate the phenomena of local perceptions. Nevertheless, there seem to be
some common expectations that the masses interpret as desirable.
First, locals seek physical and moral security for themselves and communi-
ties. As mentioned above, interpretations differ as to what constitutes secu-
rity and how it can be satisfied. In cases of mixed ethnic populations, secu-
rity may be interpreted as separation rather than integration. There is, for
example, a long-standing debate about the extent to which the Dayton
Accords ended a conflict rather than established a peace. One line of argu-
ment that tends to get marginalized is that Dayton, however dysfunction-
ally it operates politically and economically, has actually allowed a signifi-
cant proportion of the population to feel sufficiently secure over time to
allow space for initiatives that cross borders with common economic goals,
25. Profile of Vjosa Dobruna, Hunt Alternatives Fund, The Institute for Inclusive Security,
www.huntalternatives.org/pages/398_vjosa_dobruna.cfm, July 2006; author’s conversation with
Vjosa Dobruna, Reggio Emilia, 26 May 2005. See also, ‘Women, Peace and Conflict: A Decade
after Resolution 1325’. special issue of International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2, 2010.
26. Turner, ‘Creating ‘partners for peace’’.
27. See Carnahan, M., W. Durch and S. Gilmore, ‘Economic Impact of Peacekeeping’. Report for
DPKO, March 2006; Higate and Henry.
28. Pugh, M. ‘Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Spoils of Peace’. Global
Governance 8, no. 4, autumn 2002: 467–82.
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at local and regional levels.29 A sense of predictability about social connec-
tion is more important, it can be argued, than an external quest for law and
order based on state security forces (which, however much ‘reformed’, may
be the object of distrust and suspicion).
Not far behind security, and closely related to it, is the quest for restoration –
of rights, property and dignity. This is an expectation exceedingly difficult for
external actors to achieve in highly fractured societies emerging from civil war,
though property restoration measures have been tried with apparent success
in the Balkans, and various efforts to establish justice, mainly criminal justice,
have been attempted. Dignity is more likely to be achieved if local hosts are
not expected to fit into a framework of change that is arranged from outside
– rather than locals being engaged in what Duffield calls ‘unscripted conver-
sations’ and have a role in framing their adaptation to new circumstances.
Also high on local agendas are welfare and income generation. The lack of
attention to these issues is probably why coping strategies involving a variety
of informal means, often coded as ‘criminal’, are employed. I have written
extensively on this issue and will not recycle arguments available elsewhere.30
For an interesting and convergent point of view, the UNDP-sponsored
Enabling Local Ingenuity Report mentioned earlier is well worth reading. In
a provocative albeit polemical spirit, however, I will re-emphasize that the
neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes favoured by the largely unac-
countable donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) (at least
unaccountable to local interests) seem extremely risky because they take a
long-term, if not indefinitely deferred, approach to employment issues.31
The World Bank has a seat in the Peacebuilding Commission; it uses trust
funds to exercise leverage where it has no direct role, is widely considered as
an ‘ally in peacebuilding’,32 drives the donor conferences and, backed by
29. The author’s next research programme is to examine municipal innovations across ethnic and
municipal divides, on a sub-regional basis that surreptitiously looks into the current political
rigidities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
30. Most recently, ‘Work, Welfare, Resistance: Liberal Peace After the Casino Crisis’, Journal of
Intervention & Statebuilding (in press, 2010).
31. Susan Woodward has been a particularly incisive critic of IFI policies in peacebuilding, and is writ-
ing a chapter on these lines in Zaum, D. and M. Berdal (eds), Power After Peace, forthcoming, 2011.
32. ‘From New York to the Field: A Dialogue on Peace Operations. Report of a conference of UN member
states and SRSGs, 19 June 2009’. New York: International Peace Institute, January 2010: 5.
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IMF conditionalities, places state institution building at the top of its
agenda so that neo-liberal political economies can be institutionalized.
Clearly, the UNDP and donors have varying degrees of emphasis on what
needs to be done, but the culture of structural adjustment and conditional-
ity is pervasive. Local authorities then have to manage the tensions that arise.
I even venture to suggest that any ‘alliance’ between the DPKO and the
World Bank places peacekeepers in the position of ‘guarding’ a particular
interpretation of political economy that they have no business doing – espe-
cially when structural adjustment replaces social contracts with fiscal con-
tracts, and produces or reinforces a class of non-insured.33
Conclusion
Programmes of transformation rather than adjustment are likely to dis-
count resistance as ‘spoiling’. This marginalizes local agency and ‘roman-
ticizes’ (Richmond’s term) the hosts as passive subjects; victimized, inca-
pable and ready to be ‘cured’ of their il-liberalism. From this perspective,
a problem-solving approach to accountability and local perceptions is
likely to be inadequate, because it diminishes the sovereignty of those who
will have to live with an inevitably untidy peace long after the peacekeepers
have gone.
33. Duffield, M. ‘Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Inter-
ventionary Society’, Journal of Refugee Studies 21, no. 2, 2008: 145–65.
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Robust Peacekeeping: a False Good Idea?
Thierry Tardy
The concept of ‘robust peacekeeping’ emerged in the late 1990s as a
response to the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica, where UN peacekeep-
ers did not intervene to stop massive violations of human rights, on the
alleged grounds that they were not ‘robust enough’.
In 2000, the Brahimi Report referred several times to the necessity of
‘robust peacekeeping forces’ as a lesson from past experiences. Subse-
quently, mandates of newly created operations have increasingly involved
the idea that UN peacekeepers must be given the political and operational
means to implement their mandate. In particular, the simultaneous atten-
tion given to the protection of civilians in peace missions has led the Secu-
rity Council to instil a vocabulary of robustness in its resolutions. In these
different cases, robustness is understood as a way to give any operation a
degree of credibility, especially as regards spoilers. Robustness is supposed
to allow a peacekeeping force to protect itself, to ensure some freedom of
manoeuvre, and to prevent situations where the implementation of the
mandate or more broadly the peace process is taken hostage by spoilers.
Although robust peacekeeping is not a new concept and has been partially
implemented in some operations (Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Haiti, Lebanon), it has garnered new attention in 2008–10 with
developments relating to its conceptualization. Several policy documents
issued by different units of the DPKO1 have provided definitions of the
term, partly in response to critiques of confusion and lack of clarity as to
1. See United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support,
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, New York: United Nations,
2008, [hereinafter, the Capstone Doctrine]; UNDPKO-DFS. A New Partnership Agenda. Chart-
ing a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. DPKO-DFS, New York, 2009; and Office of Military
Affairs. DPKO-DFS Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping. New York: United Nations, 2009.
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the operational implications of robustness. Subsequently, robust peace-
keeping was discussed at the 2010 session of the Special Committee for
Peacekeeping Operations. The debates revealed a high degree of politici-
zation, as well as the sensitivity of the concept of ‘robustness’ – not least
among the NAM countries.
This short article aims at challenging the coherence and feasibility of the
concept of robust peacekeeping. While it recognizes the necessity and vir-
tue of a robust approach as a protection mechanism for peacekeepers, it
questions the extent to which robust peacekeeping is politically acceptable
and operationally viable. In particular, it looks at robust peacekeeping in
the context of long-lasting constraints of contemporary peace operations –
in terms of political support, availability and quality of troops, and the pro-
pensity of troop contributors to embrace a robust approach.
Definitions and Conceptual Ambiguities
There is consensus that robust peacekeeping is an ill-defined concept and
that it is, in consequence, difficult to operationalize. Two different con-
ceptions of robust peacekeeping can be distinguished: a narrow approach
and a broad approach.
The narrow approach is about enabling peacekeepers to implement their
mandate thanks to their robustness, their robust posture, their robust equip-
ment, and their propensity to resort to force, if need be, in implementing
their mandate. This approach is narrow in the sense that it focuses on the
robustness of the peacekeepers. This definition is by and large that of the
UN Capstone Doctrine, which, in its glossary of terms, defines ‘robust
peacekeeping’ as ‘the use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping opera-
tion at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to
defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians
or risk undermining the peace process’.2 In this context, robust peacekeep-
ing is also defined by what it is not – peace enforcement. Two key elements
distinguish robust peacekeeping from peace enforcement: the level of the
use of force (tactical for robust peacekeeping; strategic for peace enforce-
2. Capstone Doctrine, 98.
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ment); and the nature of consent of the host state, which is required for
robust peacekeeping but not in the case of peace enforcement.
The broad approach takes a different angle to robust peacekeeping, by
looking at it in more political terms. It is defined in the UN New Part-
nership Agenda as a ‘robust approach to peacekeeping’, which is a ‘polit-
ical and operational strategy to signal the intention of a UN mission to
implement its mandate and to deter threats to an existing peace process
in the face of resistance from spoilers’.3 This approach significantly
broadens that of the Capstone Doctrine, by recognizing that robustness
cannot be confined to the peacekeepers and their ability to use force in
defence of their mandate, but needs to be embedded into a broader
framework that combines operational and political parameters. In this
context, a ‘Concept Note on Robust Peacekeeping’ issued in 2009 by the
DPKO Office of Military Affairs offers an interim definition of robust
peacekeeping:
a posture by a peacekeeping operation that demonstrates willingness,
capacity and capability to deter and confront, including through the
use of force when necessary, an obstruction to the implementation of
its mandate.
The document emphasizes that robust peacekeeping is a ‘posture’ rather
‘than a specific activity’, meaning that ‘robustness […] can be demon-
strated in many ways, including the use of political dialogue’, but also ‘tar-
geted sanctions against identified spoilers, […] or support and incentives
to national reconciliation efforts.’4 To a certain extent, the Concept Note
seeks to reconcile the broad and narrow approaches. However, its focus
tends to be more on the military/peacekeeping dimension of the operation
rather than on its political element.
Overall, these documents help clarify what robust peacekeeping is and
what it is not. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that these
documents have not been endorsed by the UN member states, and can
3. New Partnership Agenda, 21.
4. Ibid., 3.
0000 100817 GRMAT B#4BD29E.book  Page 68  Wednesday, October 20, 2010  10:21 AM
Robust Peacekeeping: a False Good Idea? 69
therefore hardly be considered ‘UN policy’.5 Furthermore, this effort at
conceptualizing robustness has given rise to several issues on the coherence
of the term. Characteristic of contemporary peace operations is the diffi-
culty of looking at them in a compartmentalized way. That makes the nar-
row approach of robust peacekeeping as defined in the Capstone Doctrine
problematic, as it tends to single out one requirement of effectiveness with-
out embedding it into a broader framework.
What, then, is the point of promoting robustness if no political process
underlies it, if the host country is lukewarm to it, or if many key states delib-
erately stay away from UN operations and therefore are not engaged in
implementing the concept? Within the Special Committee for Peacekeep-
ing Operations (also called C-34)6, robustness seems to have been singled
out by Western states as if it were a solution to the generic problems of effec-
tiveness of peace operations. However, large participation in UN opera-
tions, the existence of a political process backed by the Security Council and
other important stakeholders, presumably equally important to the overall
success of peace missions, failed to attract the same level of attention.
The limits of the narrow approach would seem to plead for the broader
vision proposed by the New Partnership Agenda. There is talk of a ‘robust
approach to peacekeeping’ to reflect that necessity to go beyond the robust-
ness of the force and to adopt a more political approach to robustness. How-
ever, this approach runs the risk of diluting the concept of robustness. One
talks about ‘robust peacekeeping’, ‘robust strategy’, ‘robust doctrine’,
‘robust peacebuilding’7 – overlooking the very meaning of the adjective
‘robust’ in each case, and the flaws of associating it with a whole range of
terms not intuitively close to the idea of robustness. What Western states
and the DPKO wish to promote is peacekeeping with the appropriate man-
date, support, and capabilities to fulfil the mission assigned by the Security
Council. Simply put, what this is all about is effectiveness.
5. The Capstone Doctrine states in a footnote that ‘the list [of terms of its glossary] does not provide
authoritative UN definitions’, and that ‘official UN definitions are being considered in the con-
text of the ongoing terminology deliberations of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations.’ Capstone Doctrine, 100.
6. The C-34 counts 144 countries.
7. The DPKO Concept note on robust peacekeeping also talks about ‘robust support’, 3.
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In reality, quite a few countries, also in the NAM, accept the idea that peace-
keeping forces need to be able to ensure their security and implement their
mandate, potentially through a firm posture that may imply the resort to
force. Where they would disagree is with the way robustness is being
framed. That is what is expressed in the 2010 C-34 report. In the end, while
clarification on the meaning of robust peacekeeping is important, the risk of
over-conceptualization needs also to be avoided.
Robustness In The Broader Peacekeeping Context
The concept of robust peacekeeping is extremely contentious. Within the
UN, debates on robust peacekeeping have been highly politicized, also reflect-
ing strong divergences as to the meaning and implications of the concept.
Politicization of robust peacekeeping has been evident at the C-34, where
the issue was on the agenda of the 2010 session. Debates pitted the Euro-
pean Union group, which pushed for the idea of robustness, against the
NAM, which expressed concerns about the concept and its potential impli-
cations8. For European states, robustness is a response to a lack of effective-
ness of peace operations; it is aimed at enabling peacekeepers to protect
themselves properly and to preserve the necessary freedom of manoeuvre to
implement their mandate. A link is also established between robustness and
the protection of civilians, which may require a robust posture and perhaps
the capacity to use force. By contrast, many NAM countries see robustness
as deviating from the key principles of peacekeeping and as a potential
threat to the sovereignty of peace operations host countries. A parallel is
implicitly drawn between robustness and a form of neo-colonialism, and
with a new instrument of Western domination over countries of the South.
More fundamentally, the risk of abuse of a robust posture is invoked.
What is questioned here is the distinction between robust peacekeeping
and peace enforcement, and the ability of any given operation to ensure
that what initially starts as robust peacekeeping does not end as peace
enforcement. This leads to the question of the compatibility of robust
peacekeeping with three key principles of peace operations – impartiality,
8. See Proceedings of the C34 debates, GA/PK/203, 22 February 2010, and GA/PK/204, 23 Feb-
ruary 2010.
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consent of the host state and non-resort to force. For some NAM coun-
tries, the kind of use of force that is implied by robust peacekeeping, i.e. in
other cases than self-defence, is a direct challenge to the principle of non-
resort to force and therefore to the very nature of UN peace operations.
This general context of North–South divide over peacekeeping issues has
been further shaped by key trends in peace operations. Debates on con-
temporary peacekeeping cannot ignore some of its tangible characteristics,
not least the question of who is doing what in peace operations. While
Western states are the main financial contributors to the peacekeeping
budget, they have generally been absent in terms of troop contribution
since the mid-1990s. Conversely, countries of the global South have dom-
inated UN peace operations, and have therefore to a large extent shaped
the politics of peacekeeping on the ground. At the same time, despite the
changes of the last decade, the decision-making process on peacekeeping
has remained dominated by the Security Council and its permanent mem-
bers, to the detriment of the main troop-contributing countries.
This ‘division of tasks’ feeds the North–South divide and the politicization
of debates, particularly when – as is the case with robust peacekeeping – a
concept is pushed by countries that are unlikely to implement it, as they are
not present on the ground. Furthermore, the ‘commitment gap’ raises the
question of the extent to which current troop-contributing countries have
the military capabilities to be robust. Jean-Marie Guéhenno identifies three
negative consequences of the absence of Western countries on peacekeeping
robustness: first, there is ‘much less willingness among troop contributors
to take risks’ if those risks are ‘not shared by those who make the decisions’;
second, the ‘capacities available in the armed forces of the richer nations
mitigate the risks of robust peacekeeping and would make it more effective’;
third, ‘robust peacekeeping can work only if it is embedded in a broader
political strategy’, and the ‘systematic absence [of Western states] in UN
military deployments undermines the message of universal commitment
that such deployments should convey.’9 These points make clear the diffi-
9. Guéhenno, J.-M. ‘Robust Peacekeeping: Building Political Consensus and Strengthening Com-
mand and Control’. Robust Peacekeeping: The Politics of Force, New York: Center on Interna-
tional Cooperation, NYU, 2009: 9.
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culty of confining the debate to the issue of robustness. It is only one ele-
ment, among many others, of the effectiveness of peacekeeping.
These divergences led to difficult debates at the 2010 C-34 session. Some
NAM members contested the term ‘robust peacekeeping’ and put forward
that of ‘effective peacekeeping’10. In doing so, they were objecting that the
idea of robustness could be presented as the solution to what they see as
much broader problems. In the end, the C-34 report mentions neither the
term ‘robust peacekeeping’ nor ‘the use of force’.11
Robustness, How Feasible?
In this general political context, three issues require special attention as they
directly challenge the feasibility of robustness: the nature of the requirements
of robust peacekeeping, the unintended consequences of robustness, and the
varying degrees of feasibility depending on the meaning of robustness.
Requirements of Robust Peacekeeping
Robust peacekeeping implies a series of political and operational require-
ments. By definition, the reality of robustness will be questioned if those
requirements are not met. Both the DPKO ‘Concept Note on robust peace-
keeping’ and the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper provide lists of such requirements.
The UN Secretariat is justified in pushing for the improvement of state capa-
bilities and practices and setting standards in the peacekeeping domain.
However, with the very ambitious list of requirements for robust peacekeep-
ing that the UN has come up with,12 one must ask how realistic they are,
given the long-lasting constraints of contemporary peace operations. This
leads back to the ‘commitment gap’ and the extent to which the current
TCCs are in a position to make the necessary adjustments to meet the
requirements, let alone their willingness to do so. The fact is that, with a few
exceptions, the main TTCs are far from most of the requirements listed by
10. See Declaration of the Representative of Morocco on behalf of the NAM at the C34, GA/PK/
203, 22 February 2010.
11. See Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, New York: United Nations, 2010,
A/64/19, § 65.
12. The UN talks, among other things, about ‘modern technology’, ‘enhanced situational awareness
and risk analysis’, ‘comprehensive communication strategy’ or ‘high degree of mobility’.
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the DPKO. The past ten years of UN involvement in peace operations have
amply demonstrated this – as regards UN overstretch, deployment and
logistical problems, the level of equipment and TTC performance.
Unintended consequences of robustness
Secondly, the narrative in favour of robust peacekeeping generally assumes
that robustness comes as a solution to some of the difficulties facing peace
operations. Although this may be true in some circumstances, it is also
worth noting that robustness involves unintended consequences that may
challenge its relevance.
The DPKO Concept Note identifies a series of risks connected with robust
peacekeeping.13 One is the risk of conflict escalation: this requires particular
attention as it may imply an undesired shift from the use of force at the tac-
tical level (which falls within robust peacekeeping) to the use of force at the
strategic level (which characterizes peace enforcement). On the ground, it is
no easy task to make sure that the use of force indeed remains at the tactical
level and therefore stays within the boundaries of robust peacekeeping.
At the political level, the risk of loss of impartiality and legitimacy is exac-
erbated by the intrusive and coercive nature of robust peacekeeping. This
reinforces the need to embed robust peacekeeping within a political frame-
work that robustness is meant to serve.14 The effectiveness and legitimacy
of robust peacekeeping are dependent on the level of political backing that
it gets from its key stakeholders, the Security Council members, the main
TCCs and PCCs, and the host state. The full backing of the host state is
equally essential to the success of robust peacekeeping, in particular in con-
fronting ‘spoilers’. But when the consent is weak, as in Sudan and the
DRC, when the spoilers are backed by the government, as in Darfur, or
when spoilers are either the state itself, or groups like the Hezbollah, then
the very feasibility of robustness is at stake. In most UN peace missions,
the level of political support and the reality of the political process are
13. See Concept Note, 3.
14. See Berdal, M. ‘The search for security: the use and utility of force in peacebuilding operation’.
Building Peace after War. London: IISS, 2009: 100–21.
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issues of permanent concern. The extent to which robustness is possible in
these circumstances remains open to question.
Furthermore, altering the nature of peace operations by adopting a more
openly robust posture is likely to lead to some counter-reactions – in terms
of host-country level of acceptance, spoiler behaviour, impact on the local
actors, or even TCC motives and behaviours that are difficult to predict.
Robustness may deter some spoilers, but it may also induce reactions or new
forms of disruption that would not have appeared otherwise. As Gowan and
Tortolani argue, robustness creates new vulnerabilities15 that have not been
clearly identified. It follows that, although robustness is presented as a solu-
tion, there may be cases where it is actually part of the problem.
Varying degrees of feasibility depending 
on the meaning of robustness
Thirdly, the generic term of robust peacekeeping embraces both the idea
of robustness in protection of the force and robustness in defence of the
mandate, which generally includes the protection of civilians as well. This
amalgam is problematic, as the two types of activities are fundamentally
different. Robust peacekeeping in protection of the force is aimed at ensur-
ing a certain level of security to the peacekeepers and at deterring intermit-
tent or continuous harassment from spoilers. It is peacekeeper-centred and
is seen by many potential or actual contributors as a condition of their
commitment. By contrast, robust peacekeeping in defence of the mandate
and in the protection of civilians is mandate-centred, and is far more ambi-
tious than the peacekeeper-centred approach.
The two approaches involve very different postures, operational capabili-
ties and levels of political commitment, from the Security Council and
TCCs as well as from the host authorities. In Darfur, for example, where
peacekeepers have faced attacks from spoilers on a daily basis, few would
contest the necessity to guarantee the protection of the force, and this con-
ception of robustness has become broadly accepted, also by a majority of
NAM states. Yet, robustness in confronting the spoilers in a coercive way
15. See Gowan, R. and B. Tortolani, ‘Robust Peacekeeping and its Limitations’. Robust Peacekeeping:
The Politics of Force, 2009, 53.
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or in implementing the mandate is far less accepted, especially by TCCs,
some of which are neighbours to Sudan and would be reluctant to engage
in a confrontation with state-backed spoilers.
Robustness in defence of the mandate places the operation in a very differ-
ent situation. At least two issues make the difference. First, robustness in
defence of the mandate increases the degree of intrusiveness into the inter-
nal affairs of the host state as well as the risk of a shift between the use of
force at the tactical level and the use of force at the strategic level. Second,
those changes directly impact on the nature of motives and on the degree
of commitment from contributing states. Leaving aside the capabilities
issue, the key question is whether troop contributors would indeed con-
template a robust posture beyond their own protection. Similarly, to what
extent will host states be ready to accept robust peacekeeping operations
and the associated risk to their own sovereignty? A clear example here is the
case of Sudan, where President Bashir made sure that any troop contribu-
tor inclined to act ‘robustly’ would not participate.
In general terms, while the peacekeeper-centred approach to robustness
may be broadly accepted, there is little indication of readiness from the
UN member states to embrace the robust peacekeeping approach in all its
dimensions. On the contrary, most current operations show a strong reluc-
tance to take that path. True, there are some cases – as in the DRC with
Indian and Pakistani contingents, or in Haiti with Brazilian peacekeepers
– where robust action has been taken. However, only a very few countries
are ready to assume the consequences of activities of that type over a long
period. What might be better is to make a distinction between robustness
in protection of the force, and robustness in defence of the mandate. Hav-
ing the two notions under the same concept is counter-productive.
One broad conclusion can be drawn from this brief analysis. Robust peace-
keeping may have its merits, but it can hardly be considered while leaving
aside the broader peacekeeping environment and the lasting constraints fac-
ing contemporary peace operations. Those constraints may not condemn
the idea of robustness, but they certainly make clear the need for extreme
prudence in assuming that robust peacekeeping is the way forward.
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The UN and Africa – Options for Partnership 
and Support
Kwesi Aning and Horname Noagbesenu
There is a deepening relationship between the AU the EU and the UN in
their efforts to respond collectively to Africa’s security challenges, particu-
larly those posed by collaborative multidimensional peace support opera-
tions. The need to unravel and understand the multiple facets and dynam-
ics of such relationships between the AU, EU and UN was captured in a
UN Security Council Presidential statement of 28 March 2007.1 Here, the
UN Security Council re-affirmed its primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security in accordance with the UN
Charter. However, it also recognized the critical role of regional organiza-
tions such as the EU and AU in the prevention, management and resolu-
tion of conflicts. To appreciate the complexities of such interdependent
relations, a process was initiated that sought to identify and clarify the
available options, processes and procedures through which the UN could
improve its support and arrangements for cooperation and coordination,
especially with the AU, under Chapter VIII arrangements.2
Such clarification sought to deepen their relationship in areas of common
interest, particularly in peacekeeping, by focusing on promoting and
broadening the dialogue and cooperation between the UN Security Coun-
cil and the AU’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). But while AU col-
laboration on peacekeeping with the UN has been useful, it is through the
1. See UN Security Council Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2007/7 28 March 2007.
2. There is a long history to UN–regional organizations relationships. Some of the most important
documentation is S/RES/1625 (14 September 2005) on the effectiveness of the Security Coun-
cil’s role in conflict prevention. This resolution called for the strengthening of cooperation and
communication between the UN and sub-regional organizations in accordance with Chapter
VIII; also S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005), which was the first resolution adopted by the Security
Council on regional organizations.
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EU, with its provision of consistent funding options through the African
Peace Facility (APF) that the AU has managed to sustain its peacekeeping
engagements in Darfur and in Somalia.
In this article we discuss some of the challenges of coordination between
the UN, EU and AU in multinational and multifunctional peace support
operations in Africa. These institutions are different and separate bodies,
with individual comparative advantages, internal structures, capabilities,
experiences and roles. However, because the AU suffers from financial and
human resource constraints, the relationship among these institutions has
been characterized as ‘vacillating between paternalism and partnership’.3
There is also an acceptance that the international community is ‘witnessing
the emergence of a UN-AU partnership particularly in peace operations’.4
While this argument is correct, we would posit that the critical points are
to identify where the gaps are, and to improve this relationship character-
ized as either ‘emerging’ or ‘unique’. It is essential to understand the chal-
lenges that such tripartite or multilateral engagements entail, and to pro-
pose schemes for improved partnerships. Some of the factors affecting such
inter-organizational coordination of peace operations will be analysed here.
Finally, our recommendations emphasize areas that require attention
regarding efforts towards enhancing future UN-EU-AU coordination.
Situating AU, EU And UN Relations
The role and placement of regional organizations was critical during the
negotiation stages of what was to become the UN. The outcome was
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which acknowledges the scope for con-
tribution of regional arrangements but confines their role to the settlement
of disputes. Despite this recognition, there is some ambiguity about the
exact nature of such regional arrangements. While Article 52(1) states that
nothing in the Charter precludes ‘the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action’,
3. See Murithi, T. ‘Between paternalism and hybrid operations: the emerging UN and African rela-
tionship in peace operations’. Friederich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Paper No. 2 on Dialogue on
Globalisation, February 2007: 1.
4. Ibid.
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Article 53(1), ensures the supremacy of the UN Security Council in mat-
ters of peace and security:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.
But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrange-
ments or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Secu-
rity Council.
To that end, Article 54 ensures that the Security Council is kept fully
informed of activities undertaken by regional organizations for the main-
tenance of international peace and security. While the Charter offers the
legal basis for interaction between the UN and regional organizations, the
Council’s practice has not been consistent when recognizing or authoriz-
ing the actions of an organization to lead peace operations. 
As a result, from the 1990s the UN began to pay more attention to
regional organizations. In January 1992, the Security Council met at the
level of heads of state and asked the Secretary-General to recommend
ways of strengthening the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking
and peacekeeping. The response was the Agenda for Peace, issued in June
1992. Here the role of regional organizations in preventive diplomacy,
early warning systems for crisis prevention, peacekeeping and post-con-
flict peace building was highlighted, marking the birth of the concept of
a ‘regional-global security partnership’. In 2005, the Secretary-General’s
report In Larger Freedom recognized this emerging relationship and
argued for the ‘establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping
capacities’ that would allow the UN to work with the AU and EU, among
others, in predictable and reliable partnerships.5
5. See In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, report of the
Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005; see also ‘Report of the African Union – United
Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations’, ‘Prodi
Report’, S/2008/813 (31 December 2008) and ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the relation-
ship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, in
the maintenance of international peace and security’, S/2008/186 (7 April 2008).
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Interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
The emerging partnership and challenges between the UN, EU and AU in
peace operations is a relationship predominantly founded on a mutual
bond characterized by resource dependency, legitimacy and sharing of
emerging common values. The UN, EU and AU have different internal
structures, levels of experience and resources for peacekeeping operations,
and therefore different comparative advantages for peace operations in
Africa, but there is a political willingness to deepen this relationship, even
though these ‘unequal’ traits may impact on inter-organizational coordi-
nation. Recognition of such differential strengths has resulted in a descrip-
tion of this partnership as ‘an asymmetric[al] relationship’, with a caution
to the AU not to descend into a ‘relationship of hybrid paternalism’.6 Irre-
spective of such concerns, the UN still remains flexible, employing com-
paratively efficient mechanisms for large-scale resource management, and
acting with the full legitimacy of the international community. Occasion-
ally, however, political realities and decision-making procedures do work
against timely deployment and sustained engagement in areas of fragile or
failed peace. Procedures for accommodating the emerging peacekeeping
partnerships, and a modus operandi for interacting with regional organiza-
tions, are being formalized and continuously refined.7
The EU has at its disposal a range of tools for conflict prevention and crisis
management, and is currently engaged in several missions Africa. In addi-
tion, the EU provides funding to support conflict prevention, crisis man-
agement and capacity building, through mechanisms such as the APF.
However, the EU has difficulty in coordinating its member states and insti-
tutions when it comes to foreign and security policy. This creates problems
in relations with third countries and international organizations. As for the
other organizations, mustering resources for peace operations is difficult,
affecting both decisions to deploy and long-term commitment.
6. Murithi, T. ‘The African Union’s evolving role in peace operations: the AU Mission in Burundi,
Sudan and Somalia’, African Security Review 17, no. 1, 2007: 72.
7. See Joint Communiqué agreed by the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 16 June 2007.
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Chapter VIII of the UN Charter underlines the roles that regional organiza-
tions can play as partners of the UN in maintaining international peace and
security. This is the reason why, when the AU undertakes peace and security
interventions, it perceives its actions as a contribution to the UN and the gen-
eral international community, and therefore expects to be supported.8 How-
ever, UN Security Council responses to decisions made by other regional
organizations in terms of peacekeeping have been ad hoc. This points up the
need to discuss what exactly the term partnership means. This gives rise to sev-
eral questions about the nature of such relationships. For example, to what
extent can the UN support decisions taken by the AU outside the remit of the
UN Security Council? What does ‘delegation of authority’ mean?
With the increase in the interfaces and synergies between the UN and
regional organizations, the AU in particular, there appears to be recognition
that the role played by both the AU and EU as components of multilateralism
is desirable, feasible and necessary. One acknowledges the need for a global-
regional mechanism for maintaining international peace and security – and
greater involvement of the AU and EU in conflict prevention and manage-
ment, in cooperation with the UN, is part of this. It is these multiple facets of
engagement that underpin the vision of a ‘mutually reinforcing regional-glo-
bal mechanism’ for peace and security9. This mechanism can be effective if
there is a combination of flexibility with impartiality, and pragmatism with
consistency. Such an approach could reduce the endemic uncertainties and
occasional tensions between the UN, as responsible for international peace
and security, and the AU, which plays a supporting role. However, much as
there is recognition of the potential and reality for greater involvement by the
AU and EU in conflict prevention and management in Africa, in cooperation
with the UN, the real challenge is to replace the improvised, politically selec-
tive, resource-skewed approach to regionalism with a more planned, consis-
tent yet flexible, and resource-balanced style of regional and global gover-
nance on the part of the UN Security Council.10 Recent trends has been
8. See African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.145 (VIII). In this resolution by African Heads of State
and Government, it was stated inter alia that ‘…we will also bear in mind that in taking initiatives
for the promotion of peace and security in Africa in terms of chapter VIII of the UN Charter,
the AU is also acting on behalf of the international community’.
9. See UN General Assembly Security Council A/61/204 – S/2006/590, 28 July, 2006.
10. See the Prodi Panel Report, footnote 5.
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moving away from the exclusive reliance on UN-commanded peace opera-
tions, in favour of ‘hybrid’ operations in which the UN and the AU cooperate
in various ways over the same mission. But there are gaps in determining
whether this development represents a paradigm shift.
Coordination and Consultation Mechanisms
Improved partnerships between the UN and AU assume, by extension,
that there will be coordination and consultation mechanisms between the
UN Security Council and the AUPSC. The AUPSC is part of a new struc-
ture that provides a clear and new paradigm on how to construct a conti-
nental security architecture. The objectives of the AUPSC include the pro-
motion of peace, security and stability in Africa, the anticipation and
prevention of conflicts, and the promotion of peace-building and post-
conflict reconstruction. Furthermore, the AUPSC has been established as
a standing decision-making organ intended to function as a collective secu-
rity and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient
response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. Following the establish-
ment of the AUPSC in March 2004, the UNSC adopted two Presidential
statements,11 recognizing the importance of strengthening cooperation
with the AU in order to help build its capacity to deal with security chal-
lenges. This cooperation has been emphasized in a UN Security Council
resolution12 expressing support for the establishment of a ten-year capac-
ity-building programme for the African Union.
UN, EU & AU cooperation in Peacekeeping
The EU and AU have become significant contributors to international
endeavours to support states in transition from armed violence to sustain-
able peace, with both organizations showing remarkable growth in their
commitment to peacekeeping. The contribution of both the EU and the
AU lies in their intimate local knowledge, expertise in particular issue-areas,
material and personnel resources. In this sense, the AU has been active in
Burundi, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the DRC, Somalia and the Sudan, with sub-
stantial EU support for AMIS.
11. See UN Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2004/27 and S/PRST/2004/44, 19
November 2004.
12. See UN Security Council Resolution 1625, 2005.
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At present, the nature and characteristics of UN–AU cooperation in peace-
keeping are among most contentious issues, at least as regards the case of the
AU. While the AU has started and assiduously continued with the ground-
work and processes of establishing Standby Forces, this process recognizes
the importance of the UN framework, both in legal terms and as to the stan-
dards to be achieved in operations and in training. The basic assumption is
that the ASF will undertake peacekeeping activities with a view to handing
over the mandates and responsibilities to the UN in due course. AU and
regional operations should be designed with this in mind.13
In this context, crucial issues that need to be addressed include early planning
and start-up phase of an operation, during initial deployment and pre-man-
date requirements of the AU. These are to enable it to intervene before funds
are made available by the ‘international community’, through assessed con-
tributions mandated by member states or bilateral donors. Such a need for
quick responses raises a critical question: how can the AU obtain the requisite
funding to get African troops started immediately when there is a crisis?
With the increasing and deepening relationship between the UN and the
AU, there has been a determined and rolling endeavour by several partner
institutions – particularly the EU – to support Africans with a range of
financing options and capacity-building schemes designed to develop and
enhance the quality and quantity of either African peace operation capa-
bilities or contribute to UN operations. Parts of these support packages
have been primarily intended to create African capacity to launch, lead and
sustain peacekeeping interventions under the auspices of the AU and/or
one or more of its sub-regional organizations.
While the AU has shown a remarkable political will to keep the peace,
there is also no doubt that peacekeeping has grown exponentially in the
midst of competing political and budgetary requirements. As a conse-
quence, the United Nations is not always able to find the funding mecha-
nisms with the appropriate flexibility, sustainability and predictability to
enable AU troops deploy quickly. To resolve this challenge, the UN, EU
and AU must strive to reinforce a collective approach to funding peace-
13. See the Prodi Panel report.
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keeping operations. Discussions around the issues of UN financing of
peacekeeping operations undertaken by the AU gained momentum in the
context of the support to African peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Dar-
fur and Somalia, and the issue was then taken up in the context of the
Prodi report. The AU has demonstrated the political will to tackle current
and emerging conflicts, but timely responses have often been hampered by
the lack of critical logistical and financial resources.
Part of the broader discourse around the AU’s political will to engage in
peace support operations is that when it engages in such operations –
either with UN support (as in Darfur) or without (as in Somalia) – it does
so in order to stabilize a potentially dangerous situation and create favour-
able conditions for an international peacekeeping operation, on the basis
of the principles of complementarily, subsidiarity and collective solidarity.
It is, therefore, critical to examine existing institutional arrangements that
sustain the capacities of the AU to respond more effectively to new and
emerging international realities and global challenges.
Building Capacity For AU Peace Support Operations
Since the mid-1990s, capacity-building has become a buzzword of choice
among external agencies seeking to support their partners. While under-
standings of this term differ, capacity-building should go beyond what it
is currently perceived as: basically providing training to include the com-
bination of factors and activities focused on the improvement of an orga-
nization’s performance in relation to its mission, working environment
and practical resources. Capacity-building becomes necessary when vari-
ous parts of an organization and its operational practices and processes fall
short of delivering the required resources (human, financial and logistical).
The primary goals of such processes are to increase organizational effec-
tiveness and nurture ownership.
It was in recognition of this capacity gap within the AU’s peacekeeping abil-
ity that the 2005 UN World Summit called for the ‘forging of predictable
partnerships and arrangements between the United Nations and regional
organizations’ and ‘a strong African Union’. The Summit expressed its ‘sup-
port for the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capac-
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ity-building with the African Union’. Furthermore the Security Council
called on ‘states and international organizations to contribute to strengthen-
ing the capacity of […] African regional and sub-regional organizations in
conflict prevention and crisis management, and in post-conflict stabiliza-
tion.14 In the case of the AU, the aspect of its peace and security architecture
that has been targeted by most partners for concerted capacity-building
assistance and support has been the ASF, which undertakes peace support
operations. There is recognition however, that while external initiatives have
helped to improve African peace support capacities, the level of external
assistance has been lower than expected, and has not always focused on key
African concerns. In particular, the AU has not always been fully involved
in determining the nature and scope of such initiatives.
The UN modalities for supporting AU’s Peacekeeping Capacity Building
were set out in a 2004 report of the Secretary-General.15 This resulted in
the DPKO beginning, in 2006, a process to ‘implement a comprehensive
programme of support for African peacekeeping capacities’ and ‘further
develop the guiding principles for strengthening cooperation with regional
arrangements. The objective is to support the AU in the establishment of
an African Peace and Security Architecture through the establishment of
the ASF as envisaged in the African Union’s paper ‘Vision 2010’.
In this connection, the DPKO has emphasized the need to reflect the
requirements of multidimensional peacekeeping and integrated planning
and to ensure that the long-term approach is taken into account in the
AU’s planning for peacekeeping.
In order to accelerate the UN’s commitment to support African peace-
keeping capacity building, the DPKO, through the AU Peacekeeping Sup-
port Team (AU PST), is providing expertise and transfer of technical
know-how to the AU Peace Support Operations Division (AU PSOD).
This collocation of UN staff in the operational structures of the AU is
14. UN Security Council Resolution 1631, 2005.
15. See ‘Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity’, 30 November 2004 (A/59/591) and the
subsequent UN World Summit Outcome Document of 2005, which set the context for the
UN’s 10-year capacity-building programme for the AU.
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innovative. The AUPST, which became operational in January 2007,
focuses on three priority areas: mission planning, mission management, and
logistic and resource management, within the overall context of an inte-
grated, inclusive and long-term capacity-building engagement.
In parallel, the EU has an ongoing contribution to the enhancement of AU
peacekeeping capacity and its long-term capacity-building. There is no
doubt that there will be a need for continued collaborative work by UN
DPKO, the EU and the AU’s PSOD to develop a longer-term training
implementation plan to support the operational development of the ASF
in a progressive manner. This is partly done through the 2008-2010 EU-
sponsored AMANI-AFRICA cycle, aimed at supporting the AU in build-
ing its multidimensional peace operations management capacity.
Conclusion
Collaborative peacekeeping endeavours with the UN and the AU are
clearly desirable, despite the challenges remaining with both the political
and strategic calculations of all the institutions involved and the opera-
tional challenges of placing troops in theatre. Nevertheless, thanks to the
interest of these institutions in responding to glaring cases of atrocities and
preventing their recurrence, there is a general belief that such collaborative
processes are bound to continue.
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China’s Influence on the Future of UN 
Peacekeeping
Zhao Lei
China has dramatically expanded its presence in United Nations peace-
keeping operations (UNPKO) for 20 years. It has played a constructive
role in peacebuilding operations, enabling China to integrate into the
international community and assuring the world of China’s goodwill and
intention to become a responsible power.1 As a permanent member of the
UN Security Council, China is currently contributing much-needed per-
sonnel, financial as well as political support for peacekeeping and peace-
building. As a rising power with global influence, China is strategically
building its overall peacekeeping and peacebuilding capacity and is explor-
ing how to use its capacities for peace endeavours.
China: the Significant Actor in UNPKO
The year 2010 marks the 20th anniversary of the participation of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in UNPKO and the 10th anniversary of the
participation of the Chinese police force in such operations. According to
China’s Ministry of National Defence and its Ministry of Public Security:
1. This contribution uses the term ‘peacekeeping’ operations to refer to the whole spectrum of opera-
tions authorized by the UN (under Chapters VI and VII) to monitor ceasefires and/or support the
implementation of comprehensive peace agreements, bringing peace and security into focus. In prac-
tice, the objectives of peacekeeping operations have ranged from merely maintaining the status quo
to a far more ambitious approach of managing change. ‘Peacebuilding’ operations generally combine
political, security, humanitarian, development and human rights dimensions in the post-conflict
phase aimed at addressing both the immediate consequences and root causes of a conflict, laying the
foundations for sustainable peace and development. See United Nations Department of Peacekeep-
ing Operations and Department of Field Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles
and Guidelines, New York: United Nations, 2008, http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/
Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf ; Hanna Ojanen ed., Peacekeeping–Peacebuilding: Pre-
paring for the Future, Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2006, http://www.upi-
fiia.fi/assets/publications/-var-www-html-customers-wwwupi-fiiafi-doc-UPI_raportti_14.pdf
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Up to the end of March 2010, the PLA has contributed peacekeep-
ers over 15,000 persons/times to 18 UN peacekeeping missions
worldwide […] The Chinese peacekeeping troops have built and
maintained over 8,000 kilometres of road, constructed 230-odd
bridges and given medical treatment to patients for 60,000 persons/
times in the UN peacekeeping mission areas, playing a positive role
in promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes, maintaining the
regional safety and stability, and facilitating the economical and
social development in some countries.2
[From 12 January 2000 to 12 January 2010] China sent 1,569
police officers to carry out peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, Sudan and Haiti. They
have had no casualties, no discipline violations and never left in the
middle of a mission (8 Chinese peacekeepers died in the Haiti
earthquake on 13 January 2010) […] Chinese police officers have
helped crack down on local crimes, protect human rights and
rebuild local enforcement teams. They also have undertaken tasks
of patrolling, community safeguarding and investigations. […]
They have made a great contribution to regional peace and stability,
as well as people’s lives and safety.3
Concurrent to the sharp increase in China’s contribution to UNPKO
since the end of the Cold War, the Western powers have been with-
drawing or reducing their commitments to UNPKO, to be replaced by
smaller countries. In the context of this change, playing a significant
role in UNPKO is perceived as a rare opportunity to display ‘China’s
charm’. In 2006, China’s Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya,
stated ‘China felt it is the right time for us to fill this vacuum. We want
to play our role.’4 To a certain extent, China’s growing contributions
fitly and fully meet the demands of complex and challenging peace-
keeping activities. As of June 2010, China was the 15th largest contrib-
2. PLA Daily. ‘PLA Contributes a lot to UN Peacekeeping Operations’. 26 April 2010.
3. China.org.cn. ‘A decade of China’s Peacekeeping missions’. 18 January 2010, http://
www.china.org.cn/world/haitiquake/2010-01/18/content_19262239.htm
4. The Washington Post. ‘China Filling Void Left by West in UN Peacekeeping’. 24 November
2006.
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utor to UN missions, providing more troops, police and military
observers than any other permanent member of the UN Security
Council (the ‘P-5’).5
On 20 November 2009, Wei Yanwei, vice-director of the Peacekeeping
Office of China’s Ministry of National Defence, avowed that if the UN
should request the sending of combat units, the Peacekeeping Office
would timely submit the recommendations to the military and national
decision-makers. Wei added that, concerning the possibility of sending
com.bat units, China would take into account its national defence pol-
icy and the response of the ‘international community’, as well as the
wishes of host countries.6 China would have to be extremely cautious
about such deployment. Some Chinese analysts maintain that ‘the areas
currently in need of peacekeeping are suffering from turmoil at the local
level without any serious conflict involved. Even if China sends combat
troops it won’t be of much use, because engineering and medical aid are
what the locals need most.’7
China’s Interests and Motivations in UNPKO
China has reiterated its official commitment to UNPKO in its White
Paper for National Defence since 2004. It has consistently supported and
actively participated in peacekeeping operations consistent with the spirit
of the UN Charter.8 China’s peacekeeping behaviour is motivated by
diverse interests, of which three main points are highlighted here.
To begin with, participation in UNPKO has served to raise China’s
international profile. Acutely aware of its global image and reputation,
Chinas see UNPKO as an effective way to project a more benign and
positive image to the world. By contributing, China can no longer be
5. China has committed 2,117 military and police individuals in UNPKO; France 1,706; the Rus-
sian Federation 291; the United Kingdom 281; the USA only 86. See UNDPKO. Ranking of
Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations. United Nations, 30 April 2010, http://
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2010/apr10_2.pdf
6. Xinhua. ‘China Will Consider Sending Combat Units under the Request of the United Nations’.
20 November 2009.
7. China Daily. ‘Chinese combat troops ‘can join UN peacekeeping’’. 7 July 2010.
8. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. China’s National
Defence in 2004. December 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm
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labelled as a ‘dissatisfied power’ or ‘irresponsible power’. One indicator
of Beijing’s growing tangible and concrete contribution with respect to
UNPKO is seen in its efforts at improving its training capabilities. In
June 2009, the Peacekeeping Centre of China’s Ministry of National
Defence was formally set up, which benefits the PLA to further improve
its peacekeeping training and exchange with foreign militaries. In addi-
tion, all military observers accept training in the PLA Nanjing Interna-
tional Relations Academy, and all civilian police and armed police
receive training at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Centre in
the Chinese People’s Armed Police Forces Academy.9
China is an ancient civilized nation with a deep traditional influence. Its
people therefore sincerely hope that the foreign policy of China today
can be equated with that of a responsible power with a peace-loving cul-
ture. The Chinese try hard to avoid giving an impression of their coun-
try as a selfish and egotistical ‘giant’. As Dai Shaoan, vice-director of the
Peacekeeping Office put it, ‘Wherever they go or whatever they do,
[Chinese peacekeepers] always bear in mind that they are messengers of
peace, representing China […]. To win hearts and minds, you need to
devote your own hearts and minds, and that is exactly what our peace-
keepers are doing.’10
Secondly, participation in UNPKO has served to bolster China’s rela-
tions with host countries as well as with Washington and other West-
ern governments. On 30 June 2008, former US Secretary of Defense,
William Perry, met Xu Caihou, Vice-Chairman of China’s Central
Military Commission, and proposed that ‘the two armed forces should
enhance cooperation on humanitarian operations and peacekeeping
missions.’11 On 28 January 2010, Chinese peacekeeping police and US
troops carried out their first joint patrol in Haiti. As part of the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), a tactical team of 10
Chinese riot police and two squads from the US 82nd Airborne Divi-
9. China is currently promoting the capability to train Formed Police Units (FPU), and will build
a multifunctional FPU training facility at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Centre
(CPCTC). Interview with senior official of CPCTC, Langfang, 19 May 2010.
10. People Daily. ‘Peacekeeping: a Rising Role of China’s PLA’. 24 July 2007.
11. China Daily. ‘China, US Armed Forces Vow to Enhance Cooperation’. 1 July 2008.
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sion conducted a patrol in Port-au-Prince, capital of Haiti.12 The joint
effort has a special symbolic significance: the most developed Western
country and the largest developing country have common interests in
the maintenance of world peace. Moreover, the increasing military
contacts in peace operations provide lines of communication to pro-
mote military transparency and political understanding so as to reduce
the possibility of accidental confrontations. There is also a huge poten-
tial for closer peacekeeping cooperation between China and other
major Western countries. China is currently exploring the prospects
for working with the USA and the EU to help build Africa’s peacekeep-
ing capacity.
Thirdly, participation in UNPKO has served to protect Chinese inter-
ests abroad. With the growing globalization of its interests, public and
private, China needs stable overseas markets for securing a sustainable
development. As some observers note, ‘China is in increasing need for
natural resources in order to sustain its role as the workshop of the
world and requires stable markets where it can afford its products’13;
‘Instability in […] energy producing parts of Africa and the Middle East
is clearly not in China’s interests.’14
Chinese peacekeepers have witnessed the remarkable strides of China’s
‘Going Abroad’ strategy (zouchuqu zhanlue) since the late 1980s. Today,
Chinese organizations, enterprises and citizens have been increasingly
going abroad, and have been repeatedly harassed, attacked or kidnapped
by ‘terrorists’ and criminals in foreign countries. In the country of resi-
dence, Chinese peacekeepers collaborate with Chinese institutions and
organizations to protect the rightful interests of Chinese people and enter-
prises. For example, in Liberia, Chinese peacekeepers took the initiative to
rescue the Chinese fishermen robbed by pirates. In East Timor, Chinese
peacekeepers rescued the wounded and dying Chinese businessmen
12. China Daily. ‘China, US Peacekeepers Conduct Joint Patrol in Haiti’. 29 January 2010.
13. Hellström, J. Blue Berets under the Red Flag: China in the UN Peacekeeping System. Stockholm:
Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2009: 34, http://www2.foi.se/rapp/foir2772.pdf
14. Green, M.J. ‘Democracy and the Balance of Power in Asia’. The American Interest 2, no.1,
2006: 101.
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attacked by mobs, and donated blood for them.15 In short, Chinese peace-
keepers are guardians of China’s overseas national interests.
China stands to gain a lot from its peacekeeping contribution, and that in
turn encourages it to contribute further. In 2001 and 2002, only about
100 Chinese peacekeepers served in UN missions, significantly less than
the other P-5. However, from March 2004 to August 2006, China histor-
ically became the largest contributor. Since September 2006, China and
France have ranked as the biggest contributors of personnel to UNPKO,
leaving the other three P-5 countries far behind.
The Irreplaceable Stakeholder In 
International Peacebuilding
Along with the wide acceptance of peacebuilding by the international
community, China is beginning to embrace it as an indispensable stake-
holder.
Generally speaking, while peacekeeping aims to realize negative peace
(in the sense of no armed conflicts between or within countries), peace-
building is about creating or restoring stable political, economic and
social conditions for long-lasting peace. The coexistence of these two
missions reflects the functional shifts in peace operations: the changing
nature of the operational environment, with a more complex link
between diplomacy, military action and humanitarian intervention; the
changing status of national government in global governance, from
leadership to co-partnership; and the changing understanding of the
concept of security, from state security to civilian security, etc. How-
ever, it must be borne in mind that China and Western developed coun-
tries have different perspectives on the implications of peacebuilding, as
shown in Table 1 below.
15. Lei, Z.’China is a Responsible Power in UNPKO Arena’. China Report 72, no. 2 2010: 41.
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In practice, Western countries adhere to the ‘liberal peace’ agenda: the pur-
suit of economic and political reform alongside measures to resolve the con-
flict. Peace is to be ensured by liberal democracy and market economy.16 By
contrast, China maintains that liberal democracy is not the panacea, and
that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model does not exist. Security and development are
intrinsically linked, and peacebuilding would be impossible without
achievements in development. Therefore, as explained by Shen Guofang,
Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, China advocates ‘the early
realization of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-
combatants and the promotion of the repatriation, resettlement and the
economic recovery of refugees and displaced persons constitute the short-
term objectives of peacebuilding. The long-term objectives, however, are
the eradication of poverty, development of economy as well as a peaceful
and rewarding life for people in the post-conflict countries and regions.’17
Table 1. Different Perspective on the Implications of Peacebuilding 
Western perspective China’s perspective
Objective Liberal democracy priority Development priority
Focus Good governance Good government
Principle Democracy promotion
Necessary intervention
Assistance orientation
Non-intervention
Strategic Culture Pre-emptive Reactive
Method Top–down & bottom–up 
management:
Set for new constitution; hold 
national election; build multi-
party system; strengthen civil 
society, etc.
Top–down management:
Strengthen state capacity; 
enhance national identifica-
tion and national reconcilia-
tion; promote economic 
recovery etc.
Defect Challenge local ownership Lack of public participation
16. See Richmond, O. The Transformation of Peace (Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies), Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2005.
17. China.org.cn. ‘Statement by Ambassador Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative of
China to UN at the Security Council on the Topic of ‘Peace-Building: towards a Comprehensive
Approach’’. 2 February 2001, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN,
http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/thematicissues/peacekeeping/
t29428.htm
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As a traditionally wary country, China recognizes that peacebuilding is even
more complex than peacekeeping. It is not in favour of peacebuilding con-
flated with military action, humanitarian intervention or regime change,
and vigorously opposes any operation of state-building. China takes a firm
stance on the possibility of a ‘Western right’ to intervene in peacebuilding,
and tries hard to curb the development of the interventionist trend. This
demonstrates the subtle but significant shift of Chinese strategic culture:
from passively satisfying international norms to actively shaping them.
China’s Comparative Advantages in Peacebuilding
China has greatly contributed to the settlement of global issues – poverty
relief, human development, regional security and global stability in partic-
ular. Moreover, it enjoys some comparative advantages in peacebuilding.
First of all, China takes a pragmatic approach to peacebuilding. Its view of
sovereignty and intervention is not fixed: China’s position on peacebuild-
ing has evolved over time in an incremental situation-specific manner. As
it is more engaged in fragile and conflict-affected countries, China has to
re-think how to safeguard or stabilize its interests at the global level and
adapt its principles of sovereignty and non-intervention to new realities.
China holds that the norm of non-interference does not provide cover for
‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. The
pragmatic approach has emerged more evidently in recent years over the
degree to which China is being ‘socialized’ into the international commu-
nity through processes of adaptation and learning.18 In 2003, in response
to growing instability in the DRC and in Liberia, China’s Ambassador to
the UN, Zhang Yishan, argued that ‘under certain conditions, the UN
should intervene in conflict areas earlier, faster and more forcefully’.19
Secondly, China stands for stronger multilateralism, which is beneficial for
gaining wide support for its dedication to peace. Initially, multilateralism
18. Johnston, A.I. ‘Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy
in the 1980s and 1990s’. The China Journal, No. 35, 1996: 27–61.
19. China.cn.org. ‘Statement by H.E. Ambassador ZHANG Yishan, Deputy Permanent Represen-
tative of China to the United Nations, at the Fourth Committee of the 58th Session of the UN
General Assembly, on UN peacekeeping’. 16 October 2003, Permanent Mission of the People’s
Republic of China to the UN, http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/yshy/t56587.htm
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was China’s answer to counter US unilateralism and hegemony. When the
UN authority is challenged, China is willing to act as a ‘defender’ of the
UN system.20 More recently, China has acknowledged the great benefits
and potential of the UN system, and has begun to pursue all-round mul-
tilateral diplomacy.
China reiterates that the UN is at the core of multilateralism, and plays an
irreplaceable role in international cooperation to ensure global security.
Such a role can only be strengthened and must not in any way be weak-
ened.21 To this end, China sees its contribution to peacebuilding as a way
to strengthen the UN regime, and firmly insists that ‘the UN is the best
venue to practice multilateralism, and an effective platform for collective
actions to cope with various threats and challenges.’22
Thirdly, China has the advantage of a multifaceted identity. It has devel-
oped its own definition of dual national identities: rising great power and
the largest developing country. This means it can behave as a developing
country which, like many such countries, can contribute personnel to
peacekeeping and peacebuilding – but, unlike them, also has a voice and
the right to set agendas in the UN Security Council. China feels obliged
to take the interests of Third World countries into account, and its seat in
the Security Council ensures that its voice on peacebuilding will be heard
within international politics.
Therefore, in peace operations, China can act as a connector between
Western and Third World countries and play a bridging role between
developed and developing countries. More importantly, China’s growing
20. Deng, Y. and T.G. Moore, ‘China Views Globalization: Towards a New Great Power Politics?’.
The Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3, 2004, 126; Kim, S.S. ‘China and the United Nations’, in
E. Economy and M. Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects, New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999: 61.
21. China.cn.org. ‘Build toward a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity, Speech
by President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations Summit, Permanent
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN’, 14 September 2005, Permanent Mission of
the People’s Republic of China to the UN, http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t212915.htm
22. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. ‘Position Paper of the People’s
Republic of China on the United Nations Reform’, 7 June 2005, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
zxxx/t199318.htm
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participation grants political credibility to peacebuilding missions, and
tempers the host government’s suspicions that the missions are dominated
by Western countries.
Lastly, Chinese peacekeepers are well qualified to do hard work in severe
and dangerous mission areas, and the impartiality of Chinese peacekeepers is
much appreciated by host countries. As Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang
point out, on the basis of their substantial field research and interviews,
‘Chinese peacekeepers are consistently rated among the most professional,
well-trained, effective and disciplined contingents in UN peacekeeping
operation.’23 To date, no allegation of misconduct has been lodged against
Chinese peacekeepers. But the most attractive strength of Chinese peace-
keepers as assessed by Chinese people is that they adhere firmly to the prin-
ciple of non-interference in the internal affairs of host countries.
China’s Ongoing Contributions to Peacebuilding
Though peacekeeping and peacebuilding are different activities, they are
interrelated and mutually reinforcing. China constructively participates in
all aspects of the creation of peacebuilding operations.
Firstly, China has been increasing its peacebuilding tasks in peacekeeping
operations. In recent years, some of activities of UNPKO have also
included peacebuilding tasks to varying degrees. Recognizing the needs of
civilian populations marginalized from access to heath care as well as the
fact that the origin of conflicts is usually intimately linked to under-devel-
opment, Chinese peacekeepers focus on providing critical engineering,
transportation, and medical services, such as rehabilitating roads and pro-
viding essential healthcare services to UN staff as well as to the local pop-
ulation, which opens up the possibility for local people to contribute to
their own development. China has also deployed well-drilling platoons to
Africa. On 12 December 2009, after more than 20 days of drilling, the
third batch of the Chinese engineering contingent in Darfur finally drilled
23. Gill, B. and C. Huang. China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping: Prospects and Policy Implication.
Stockholm: SIPRI Policy paper, 2009, p 25.
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clean-water wells.24 So far, six well have been successfully drilled, contrib-
uting notably to the alleviation of water shortages in the region.25
Further, China is enhancing the capacity of its peacekeepers to carry out
civilian protection. The three training facilities have arranged courses to
ensure that peacekeepers have the appropriate skills and knowledge, espe-
cially linguistic, to carry out civilian protection tasks, and that they have a
deeper understanding of the historical, political and cultural dynamic of
conflicts. Because civilian tasks have expanded in contemporary missions,
China is strengthening its civilian deployment capacity with expertise in
security, rule of law, development and human rights, to compensate for the
function defects of military personnel. In addition, in order to cooperate
with Chinese peacekeepers in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinte-
gration, Chinese enterprises contribute in hiring former combatants to
solve the problem of local unemployment and accelerate their reintegration.
In addition to the above-mentioned contributions in the field of peacekeep-
ing, China is seeking to explore and broaden its peacebuilding endeavours.
In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao promulgated the ‘New Historic
Missions’, which ordered the PLA to develop the capabilities necessary to
protect China’s interests at home and abroad. This parallels the PLA’s
growing interest in expanding its MOOTW (Military Operations Other
Than War) – such as counter-piracy, disaster response and humanitarian
relief, in China and abroad.26 On 12 May 2009 the first Disaster Preven-
tion and Reduction Day was celebrated in China. The General Staff Head-
quarters of the PLA announced that the PLA had established an ‘armed
force system’ for MOOTW, consisting of five specialized forces: flood and
disaster relief force; post-earthquake emergency rescue force; emergency
rescue force for nuclear, chemical and biological disasters; emergency relief
force for transportation facilities; and international peacekeeping force.27
24. PLA Daily. ‘Chinese Peacekeepers to Darfur Drill Two Drinking Water Wells’. 17 December 2009.
25. Global Times. ‘Chinese Soldiers Hone Skills on Frontlines of Peace’, 10 May 2010.
26. Gill and Huang. China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping, 15.
27. PLA Daily. ‘PLA constructs MOOTW arms force system’. 14 May 2009.
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China’s counter-piracy involvement off the Horn of Africa exemplifies its
peacebuilding contribution. Piracy emerged in Somalia as a consequence
of civil war, poverty and the impossibility of finding gainful employment.
In 2009, Somali pirates carried out 217 attacks, 47 vessels were hijacked
and 867 crewmembers were taken hostage. As of late 2009, Somali pirates
were holding captive 12 large ships with 263 crewmembers aboard.28
Under these circumstances, China has expanded its patrol zone in piracy-
hazardous regions off Somalia. It has been approved to lead the coordina-
tion of international anti-piracy patrols, which means that China will need
to send more than the three ships it keeps deployed off the Horn of Africa
to protect the vital trade routes linking Asia to Europe.29
Finally, participation in disaster prevention and reduction is another sig-
nificant aspect of China’s peacebuilding efforts. China suffers the most
natural disasters of all countries. On 11 March 2009, the Chinese govern-
ment released a White Paper, ‘China’s Actions for Disaster Prevention and
Reduction’, focusing on China’s international cooperation in disaster pre-
vention and reduction.30 Shortly afterwards, on 14 November 2009, the
China International Search and Rescue Team (CISAR) passed the IEC
(INSARAG External Classification) of heavy rescue teams, becoming the
12th heavy rescue team in the world and the second in Asia. The CISAR is
engaged in its expansion and will be increased to 480 members with new
equipment by the end of 2010. The development of CISAR will contrib-
ute greatly to China’s crisis response and management as well as to inter-
national humanitarian relief.
Conclusion
To China, the rise of a country means the rise of its comprehensive power,
with soft power standing equal to hard power. China’s contribution to world
28. Rusnavy.com. ‘EU Applauded China’s Intention to Lead International Counter-piracy Activities’, 29
January 2010, http://rusnavy.com/news/othernavies/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=8614&print=Y
29. By committing to provide an ‘enduring’ presence in the corridor, China will be eligible to lead
as part of a new rotating chairmanship, which will switch every 3–4 months. See Global Times.
‘China to Lead Anti-piracy Patrols off Somali Coast’. 28 January 2010.
30. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. ‘China’s Actions for
Disaster Prevention and Reduction’. 11 March 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/archive/2009-05/
11/content_17753558_8.htm
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peace lies in the global multilateral but effective way to enhance its soft
power by means of, or in the form of, hard power. Through these efforts,
China’s good image as an aid donor, peace contributor, conflict mediator,
emergency rescuer, and even initiator of new institutions, coupled with the
attractiveness of its development model, allows China to accelerate the pace
of its peaceful rise.
China’s contribution in peacekeeping and peacebuilding is likely to grow as it
begins to feel more comfortable with such activities. On the other hand, and
not least after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, ensuring the safety of peacekeepers
in mission areas has become a top concern. For 20 years, China has paid a
heavy price in the cause of world peace: the lives of eight military officers and
eight police officers sacrificed for peacekeeping operations. In UN history, the
failure of many peacekeeping operations has often stemmed from the fact that
the casualties far exceeded the limits tolerable to the contributing countries.
In sum, the shift of China’s role and the promotion of its status in peace-
keeping and peacebuilding reflect the evolution of China’s national iden-
tity and adjustment of its peace strategy. Despite the challenges, peace
operations offer opportunities to buttress China’s national interests and
extend its influence overseas. Compared to other diplomatic measures,
peacekeeping and peacebuilding stand out as relatively low-cost ways in
which to fulfil China’s commitment to world peace.
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UN Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar
Wednesday, 23 June 2010 and Thursday, 24 June 2010
Programme
Wednesday, 23 June 2010
Opening Session
Welcome address: Ambassador Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Centre for
Security Policy (GCSP) and David Haeri, Head of the Peacekeeping
Best Practices Section, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (UNDPKO), New York
Overview of seminar objectives and programme: Dr Thierry Tardy, Fac-
ulty Member, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and Cedric
de Coning, Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs (NUPI) and ACCORD
Session 1: The ‘New Horizon’ and Beyond
Moderator: Yvonne Kasumba, African Standby Force, Civilian Planning
and Coordination Officer, African Union, Addis Ababa
Presentation: Rebecca Jovin, Policy Planning Officer, United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), New York
Session 2: Managing Consent – the New Variable?
Moderator: Dr Gillian Cull, Strategic Planner, United Nations Depart-
ment of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Office of the Assistant
Secretary-General, Office of Operations, New York
Presentation: Professor Ian Johnstone, Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts
Discussant: Dr Almut Wieland-Karimi, Director, Center for International
Peace Operations (ZIF), Berlin
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Discussant: Dr Benjamin de Carvalho, Senior Research Fellow, Norwe-
gian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)
Session 3: Expanding and Engaging TCCs, PCCs and Civilian Contrib-
utors: Towards a Capability-driven Approach to Peacekeeping
Moderator: Lieutenant General Randhir K. Mehta, United Service Institute
of India
Presentation: Cedric de Coning, Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of
International Affairs (NUPI) and ACCORD
Presentation: Professor Donald C.F. Daniel, Core Faculty, Security Stud-
ies Program, Walsh School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC
Discussant: Dr Lei Zhao, Associate Professor, Deputy Director, Interna-
tional Relations Institute for International Strategic Studies, The Party
School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
Discussant: Dr Albrecht Schnabel, Senior Fellow, Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Session 4: Accountability and Credibility: Assessing Host Population
Perceptions & Expectations
Moderator: Roxaneh Bazergan, Policy and Planning Officer, United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO),
New York
Presentation: Professor Michael Pugh, Department of Peace Studies, Uni-
versity of Bradford,
Discussant: Professor Alcides Costa Vaz, University of Brasilia
Discussant: Vincenza Scherrer, UNSSR Project Coordinator, Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Thursday, 24 June 2010
Session 5: Robust Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians
Moderator: Col (GS) Jacques Baud, Head Policy and Doctrine, United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Office
of Military Affairs, New York
Presentation: Dr Thierry Tardy, Faculty Member, Geneva Centre for Secu-
rity Policy (GCSP)
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Discussant: Annika Hilding-Norberg, Project Leader, Challenges Forum,
Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm
Discussant: Dr Alexandra Novosseloff, Research Associate, Centre Thucy-
dide, University of Paris 2
Session 6: The UN and Africa – Options for Partnership and Support
Moderator: Dr William J. Durch, Senior Associate, Director of Future of
Peace Operations Program, The Stimson Center, Washington, DC
Presentation: Horname Noagbesenu, Senior Legal Officer, Kofi Annan
International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra
Discussant: Eric Berman, Managing Director, Small Arms Survey, Geneva
Discussant: Capt (Navy rtd) Johan Potgieter, Senior Researcher, Peace
Missions Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria
Wrap-up Discussion & Closing Session
Moderators: Cedric de Coning and Dr Thierry Tardy
Closing remarks: David Haeri, Head of the Peacekeeping Best Practices
Section, UNDPKO, New York
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Beyond the ‘New Horizon’
With over 120,000 deployed personnel across 16 missions, and at a cost 
of approximately USD 8 billion per year, the scale of UN peacekeeping 
in 2010 is unprecedented. In July 2009, the UN secretariat released the 
non-paper ‘A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for 
UN Peacekeeping.’ Since then, a dialogue has taken place between the 
Secretariat, the member states and regional partners, that has helped 
identify a set of common priorities to strengthen peacekeeping. However, 
several important issues of contemporary peacekeeping practices were 
not explored in depth in the context of the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper. 
Others have emerged subsequently.
It is with such issues in mind that the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, in partnership with 
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, organized the ‘UN 
Peacekeeping Future Challenges Seminar’ in Geneva in June 2010. The 
objective was to facilitate a dialogue among the research and policy 
community, and to stimulate frank discussion on the range of factors 
most likely to infl uence and direct peacekeeping developments over the 
next few years. This report is an edited volume of the contributions 
prepared for the seminar and covers the following topics:
• Managing consent by host governments and parties to a confl ict 
• Increasing the quantity and quality of civilian and military personnel available 
for UN peacekeeping missions 
• The role of host population perceptions of and expectations from UN 
peacekeeping 
• The challenges of conceptualizing and operationalizing doctrinal approaches 
such as ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘protection of civilians’ 
• Future options for partnership and support between the UN and the AU 
• The role of China in UN peacekeeping
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